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In the last three decades strategic alliances have become a central element in many firms’ 
capability development strategies as they allow firms to rapidly access and utilize new 
knowledge that is costly and time-consuming to develop internally (Kale and Singh, 2009). This 
trend is especially prevalent in high-technology industries where shortening product life-cycles 
and the surging rate of technological innovation motivate firms to rely on external knowledge 
sources to develop new products and services and to remain competitive (Mowery, Oxley, and 
Silverman, 1996, 1998; Kale and Singh, 2009). In addition to allowing firms to share the costs 
and risks of innovation and facilitating rapid entry to foreign markets (Mowery et al., 1996), 
alliances also enable them to access complementary capabilities (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008), 
to increase the efficiency in utilization of their resources (Ahuja, 2000b), and to enhance their 
market power (Kogut, 1991). Consequently, many firms consider external collaborations as vital 
complements to internal capability development efforts in their corporate development strategies 
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Hagedoorn and Wang, 2012).  
 Concurrent with the increasing importance of alliances, a voluminous literature has 
emerged that examines how firms can benefit from alliances. Recognizing the role of alliances in 
facilitating the transfer of tacit knowledge across partnering firms (e.g. Mowery et al., 1996; 
Inkpen, 1998; Inkpen and Dinur, 1998), numerous studies examined how firms can acquire their 
competitors’ knowledge by forming alliances with them (e.g. Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad, 1989; 
Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998; Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell, 2000;  for a review see 




experience improves firms’ capabilities to manage their subsequent alliances (e.g. Anand and 
Khanna, 2000; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002; Sampson, 2005) as well as their acquisitions 
(Porrini, 2004; Kale and Singh, 2009; Zollo and Reuer, 2010). Recognizing that many firms 
engage in multiple simultaneous alliances, researchers recently began analyzing firms’ alliances 
as a portfolio rather than in isolation (e.g. Parise and Casher, 2003; Hoffmann, 2007; Lavie and 
Miller, 2008;  for a review see Wassmer, 2010), pointing at the need to understand the 
implications of alliances to partnering firms beyond the single alliance level (Kale and Singh, 
2009). 
 While the current literature provides valuable insights to benefits of alliances for 
partnering firms, there are several areas in which theoretical explanations and empirical evidence 
are rather scarce. First, while research on alliance portfolios provides new and valuable insights 
to management and performance implications of alliance portfolios (e.g. Heimeriks and 
Duysters, 2007; Lavie, 2007), we know relatively little about the factors that lead firms to alter 
the configurations of their alliance portfolios over time (Wassmer, 2010). Second, while many 
firms join alliances to acquire knowledge from their alliance partners, alliances also allow 
partnering firms apply their complementary knowledge bases toward a joint outcome, without 
knowledge acquisition being a primary goal  (Mowery et al., 1996; Nakamura, Shaver, and 
Yeung, 1996; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Inkpen and Tsang, 2007). These alliances are 
motivated by complementary specialization rather than knowledge acquisition because each 
partner focuses on its own area of expertise. Although complementary specialization is a 
commonly utilized alliance strategy in many high-technology industries, it received scant 
scholarly attention and its antecedents and consequences are not as thoroughly known as those of 




can teach firms how to manage acquisitions by transferring their alliance management practices 
to their acquisitions, studies in this area consider alliance experience as a homogenous construct, 
ignoring heterogeneities in terms of management practices among a firm’s previous alliances.  
In an attempt to improve the understanding of strategic alliances and their benefits to 
partnering firms, the three studies in this dissertation provide theoretical explanations and 
empirical evidence in these under-researched yet theoretically and managerially important areas. 
I begin by examining firm’s how alliance portfolios evolve over time. As a firm’s alliance 
portfolio is ultimately shaped by the characteristics of each incremental alliance, I investigate 
how a firm choses its partner and the focal technological area in its newly formed alliances, with 
respect to alliances already in its portfolio.  
Alliance portfolio evolution 
 A firm that makes its alliance formation decisions with a portfolio approach and builds a 
coherent alliance portfolio can realize synergistic gains by leveraging knowledge across the 
partners within the portfolio (Duysters, 1999; Wassmer, 2010). Each alliance formation decision 
requires a firm to make choices about the partner (e.g., whether to ally with an existing partner or 
with a novel one), governance mechanisms, and scope of the alliance. Such decisions about a 
firm’s individual alliances collectively determine the configuration of its alliance portfolio 
(Wassmer, 2010). This configuration is directly related to a firm’s value generation potential 
from its set of partnerships as it determines “the position of the focal firm in the 
interorganizational field and the quality and quantity of external resources to which the focal 
firm has access” (Hoffmann, 2007 p.830). Recognizing this importance, numerous studies 




generated through their external collaborations (e.g. Parise and Casher, 2003; Hoffmann, 2007; 
Lahiri and Narayanan, 2013). However, empirical evidence suggests that for many firms alliance 
portfolios evolve into a random collection of alliances rather than a coherent portfolio (Bamford 
and Ernst, 2002; Kale and Singh, 2009).  
 A possible reason why the insights from these prescriptive studies are not adequately 
reflected in firms’ patterns of alliance activities is that these studies implicitly assume that firms 
make alliance formation decisions rationally as parts of an overall corporate development 
strategy, whereas in reality firms may be making such decisions as a response to other short-term 
stimuli (Wassmer, 2010). Although the understanding of how alliance portfolios should evolve is 
relatively well-developed, theoretical insights and empirical evidence regarding how they 
actually evolve remain limited. In Chapter 2 I address this issue, and examine how performance 
feedback (performance relative to aspiration levels) influences alliance portfolio decisions. 
Drawing on the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963), a substantial body of 
literature (e.g. Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 2003a; Baum et al., 2005; Audia and Greve, 2006) 
demonstrates that performance feedback affects many organizational decisions such as alliance 
formations. Consistent with this line of research, I argue and find that while divergence from 
performance aspirations motivates risk-taking in alliance portfolio decisions, the type and nature 
of the risk a firm assumes differs depending on weather the firm performs above or below its 
aspirations. 
 As emphasized by research on alliance portfolios, alliances are important instruments 
with which firms can access and utilize new knowledge, especially in high-technology industries. 
While external technological knowledge utilization through alliances can be expected to 




alliances (Nakamura et al., 1996). While some alliances facilitate knowledge acquisition between 
partnering firms, increasing the similarity between their technological capability portfolios, 
others allow partnering firms to specialize in complementary areas, resulting in more dissimilar 
but complementary capabilities. In the third chapter of the dissertation, I distinguish between 
knowledge acquisition and complementary specialization as alternative knowledge utilization 
strategies in alliances, and perform a comparative analysis of these strategies in terms of their 
antecedents.  
Knowledge utilization in alliances 
While many firms consider the cooperation mechanisms provided by alliances as 
conduits to acquire knowledge from their partners, knowledge acquisition may not always be a 
feasible or desirable goal in alliances for several reasons. First, if the knowledge that a firm seeks 
to acquire is highly tacit or complex, it may not be effectively transferred without acquiring the 
organizational unit in which that knowledge resides (Huber, 1991). Second, competitive 
pressures to continuously introduce new products and services may leave firms little time to 
successfully acquire their alliance partners’ knowledge and convert it to commercial outcomes, 
which is a time-consuming process (Lubatkin, Florin, and Lane, 2001). In addition, firms may be 
unwilling to share knowledge with competing alliance partners if they perceive that their partners 
are benefiting more from the alliance (Khanna et al., 1998). Complementary specialization is an 
effective alternative external knowledge utilization strategy for firms to respond to these 
challenges. This strategy does not only allow alliance partners to benefit from each other’s 
knowledge without incurring the costs of acquiring that knowledge, it also enables firms to 
exploit their own competences by targeting their innovative efforts to their respective areas of 




 Research on external knowledge utilization through alliances traditionally considered 
knowledge acquisition as the primary knowledge utilization outcome sought by firms, and 
identified factors which enhance knowledge acquisition from alliance partners such as 
technological overlap (e.g. Mowery et al., 1996; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 2002) and prior 
alliance experience (e.g. Sampson, 2005). Although technological overlap and alliance 
experience are widely recognized to enhance interfirm collaboration and knowledge utilization in 
alliances, their impact on alternative knowledge utilization outcomes, such as complementary 
specialization, has not been thoroughly researched. While Mowery et al. (2002) show that 
technological overlap enhances both knowledge acquisition and complementary specialization in 
alliances, the understanding of how these commonly recognized antecedents of external 
knowledge utilization influence complementary specialization, in comparison to knowledge 
acquisition, in alliances remains limited. I discuss these issues in Chapter 3. I argue and find 
empirical support that while technological overlap between alliance partners enhances 
complementary specialization within an alliance, prior alliance experience is conducive to 
interpartner knowledge acquisition.  
 An emerging stream of research suggests that the outcomes of alliances also influence 
firms’ other organizational activities. More specifically, as a firm accumulates experience in 
alliances, the actions and procedures used to manage its alliances are stored in its organizational 
memory and transferred to similar future organizational events, such as acquisitions (Porrini, 
2004; Kale and Singh, 2009; Zollo and Reuer, 2010). In the fourth chapter of the dissertation I 
examine how a firm’s experience in knowledge acquisition and complementary specialization 




Alliance experience and acquisitions 
 As the importance of external sources for firms’ capability development increases, 
acquisitions in addition to alliances have become a prominent strategy for many firms (Haleblian 
et al., 2009; Makri, Hitt, and Lane, 2010). After having experienced a setback following the 
global financial crisis in 2008, acquisition activity resumes to grow with firms worldwide 
spending 2.91 trillion US dollars in 2013 for acquisitions (Dealogic, 2014). Despite this 
economic importance, many firms struggle to manage their acquisitions, and most acquisitions 
fail to create shareholder value (Barkema and Schijven, 2008). Intrigued by this paradox, 
scholars examined how firms can learn to manage their acquisitions and found that experience in 
acquisitions as well as in other similar organization activities, such as alliances, influence 
subsequent acquisition performance (for a review see Barkema and Schijven, 2008). This 
research stream demonstrates that the influence of past organizational activities on the 
performance of subsequent ones depends on the extent to which the past and subsequent 
activities require similar management practices (e.g. Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Haleblian 
et al., 2009). Thus, scholars investigating the relationship between alliance experience and 
acquisition performance focused their efforts on identifying acquisition contexts in which the 
management practices developed in alliances are applicable (Porrini, 2004; Zollo and Reuer, 
2010).  
 An important shortcoming of these studies is that they consider alliance experience as a 
homogenous construct and assume that all alliances are managed similarly. Alliances however 
differ in terms of their management practices, depending on their strategic goals. For instance, 
knowledge acquisition alliances require partnering firms to collaborate more closely than 




for partnering firms in knowledge acquisition alliances is to coordinate their joint operations, in 
complementary specialization alliances it is to align their alliance-related activities while 
maintaining their autonomous operations (Lui, 2009). Experience in these different types of 
alliances therefore equips firms with different managerial skills, which may impact differently 
the management and performance of their future acquisitions. In Chapter 4 I examine these 
differential effects. I find that the influence of experience in knowledge acquisition and 
complementary specialization alliances on the performance of future acquisitions depends on the 
degree of autonomy required in the management of these acquisitions.  
Capability development through alliances 
While alliances are of vital importance to many firms to develop new capabilities, they 
also inflict substantial economic and managerial costs to firms (e.g. Pisano, 2006 p.180), which 
makes effective design and management of alliance strategies crucial. Nevertheless, recent 
research suggests that firms often fail to realize the potential benefits of their alliances (Kale and 
Singh, 2009 p.45). Given the vast amount of literature on formation and management of alliances 
this finding is remarkable and provides two important insights. First, managers need more 
precise guidance to carry out alliance activities. Second, research on alliances should be more 
closely aligned with practice. Taken together, the three studies in this dissertation attempt to 
make contributions in both areas. 
I believe that understanding the antecedents of actual firm behavior is important to bring 
theories on alliance strategies closer to practice (Powell, Lovallo, and Fox, 2011), and take a 
behavioral approach (Cyert and March, 1963) in Chapter 2 to examine the evolution of firms’ 




aspirations affects its alliance formation decisions, this study can help managers to become more 
self-reflective in making these decisions, and aid corporate stakeholders in interpreting and 
evaluating managerial behavior. In Chapters 3 and 4 I compare two alternative external 
knowledge utilization strategies, knowledge acquisition and complementary specialization, in 
terms of their antecedents as well as their implications for management of subsequent 
acquisitions. Jointly, these studies contribute to and bridge the research streams in organizational 
learning in alliances on the one hand (e.g. Mowery et al., 1996, 2002; Inkpen and Tsang, 2007), 
and experience spillovers across alliances and acquisitions on the other (Porrini, 2004; Zollo and 
Reuer, 2010). The central insight of these chapters is that firms should consider their alliances as 
parts of an overall corporate development strategy, rather than isolated events driven by short-
term objectives. To aid managers in doing so, the findings of these studies provide precise advice 
as to how firms can equip themselves with necessary skills to realize their knowledge utilization 
goals in their alliances and how they can leverage their experience in alliances to manage their 
acquisitions.  
As tapping into external knowledge sources for capability development is becoming 
increasingly important, firms increase their reliance on strategic alliances to enhance their 
competitiveness (Kale and Singh, 2009 p.45). Therefore, the need for scholarly research to 
understand, explain and guide firms’ alliance activities, as well as their implications on different 
dimensions of firm performance is greater than before. The goal of this dissertation is to take the 
research in this area one step further. Collectively, the three studies in this dissertation examine 
the relationships between various alliance attributes such as partner choice, technological focus, 
and different knowledge utilization outcomes on the one hand, and two dimensions of firm 




other, as shown in Figure 1. In doing so, the three studies underscore that while a firm’s alliances 
influence its performance outcomes; performance outcomes also shape its alliance activities. My 
findings offer insights to improve the understanding and management of strategic alliances, as 
well as to enhance innovation through interfirm collaboration, thereby providing actionable 
guidelines to managers and other corporate stakeholders in shaping the corporate development 
strategies of their firms. 










We develop performance feedback models to examine when and how firms 
simultaneously reconfigure the technological scope and partner mix of their 
alliance portfolios following an assessment of firm performance relative to 
aspirations. Analysis of panel data on U.S. biotechnology firms, 1981-2000, shows 
that below-aspiration performance is associated with the formation of alliances 
with novel partners within the technological scope of the existing alliance 
portfolio. In contrast, above-aspiration performance is associated with the 
formation of alliances with existing partners outside the technological scope of the 
existing alliance portfolio. Finally, results show evidence of inertia below 
aspirations, in that firms’ greater equity commitments to their existing alliance 
partners diminish their propensity to form alliances with novel partners. 
 







In line with the increasing prevalence of interfirm alliances to tap into outside knowledge 
sources, many firms simultaneously engage in multiple alliances with different partners to 
improve their innovation performance (Wassmer, 2010). Recognizing this fact, recent studies 
have begun to analyze firms’ alliance activities from a portfolio perspective (Parise and Casher, 
2003; e.g. Hoffmann, 2007; Lavie, 2007; Lavie and Miller, 2008;  see Wassmer, 2010 for a 
review), emphasizing the need to understand the management, evolution, and performance 
implications of alliances beyond the single alliance level. While research in this stream provides 
new and valuable insights regarding the management and performance implications of alliance 
portfolios, the evolution and reconfiguration of alliance portfolios has received much less 
scholarly attention to date. More specifically, we know little about what leads firms to 
reconfigure their alliance portfolios over time (Wassmer, 2010). 
Although studies linking firm performance to various alliance portfolio characteristics, 
such as partner diversity (Jiang, Tao, and Santoro, 2010) and technological scope (Vasudeva and 
Anand, 2011), provide insights regarding performance-enhancing alliance portfolio 
configurations, research also suggests that few firms manage their alliances as a coherent 
portfolio and many firms fail to configure their alliance portfolios to unlock their full potential 
(Bamford and Ernst, 2002; Kale and Singh, 2009). It thus appears that the practical implications 
of insights from alliance portfolio research on firms` alliance activities remain rather limited. 
Exploring the factors that lead firms to alter the configuration of their alliance portfolios is 
therefore an important endeavor to understand the antecedents of firm behavior that shapes 




We draw on performance feedback theory (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2003a) to 
propose and test a conceptual framework of when and how firms reconfigure their alliance 
portfolio over time. Performance feedback theory argues that decisions about organizational 
actions are a function of firm performance relative to an aspiration level, i.e., a measurable 
anchoring point on a relevant performance variable that defines the boundary between perceived 
success and failure (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2003a), based on a 
firm’s historical performance or the performance of other comparable firms (Levinthal and 
March, 1981; Greve, 2003a p.42-48 ; Bromiley and Harris, 2014). Performance away from the 
aspiration level is believed to increase the likelihood of risky search, though the nature and 
domain of search may be distinct depending on whether it is prompted by perceived failures or 
successes (e.g. Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2003a). Building on this key insight, we use 
performance feedback theory to examine how performance below and above aspirations has 
distinct implications for how firms reconfigure their alliance portfolios over time. This theory 
presents a suitable theoretical approach to study the reconfiguration of alliance portfolios 
because a comparison of performance to pre-existing aspiration levels offers an intuitive 
heuristic to boundedly-rational actors, which helps categorize recent firm performance as either a 
perceived success or a failure, in turn generating implications for the extent and domain of risky 
organizational actions such as decisions about alliance portfolio reconfiguration. We specifically 
focus on innovation performance, because, given the prominence of R&D alliances in many 
firms’ competitive strategies, we believe that this performance measure is more directly related 
to firms’ alliance activities than financial or accounting performance measures. 
While the configuration of alliance portfolios can be captured in a number of ways, 




partner choice, scope of activities, and governance mode in each of their alliances (Jiang et al., 
2010; Lavie, Kang, and Rosenkopf, 2011; Duysters et al., 2012). Among these three dimensions, 
the first two are shown by the literature to influence innovation performance: While alliance 
portfolio technological scope directly affects innovation performance through its impact on 
firms’ absorptive capacities (Vasudeva and Anand, 2011), partner choice has indirect effects by 
enabling firms to tap into novel knowledge sources (Baum et al., 2005). We therefore focus our 
attention here on two alliance portfolio dimensions, namely the portfolio’s technological scope 
(the number of distinct technological areas covered across all of a firm’s alliances) and partner 
mix (the mix of novel and repeat partners). Specifically, we focus on how firms make 
simultaneous decisions about technological scope and partner choice in their newly formed 
alliances, with respect to the existing technological scope and partner mix of their alliance 
portfolios, as a result of performance feedback.  
We propose and find that when firms perform below aspirations, they form new alliances 
with novel partners, yet within the existing technological scope of their alliance portfolios. In 
contrast, when performance exceeds aspirations, firms form new alliances outside the 
technological scope of their alliance portfolios, yet with existing alliance partners. We further 
find that the strength of a firm’s equity commitments to its existing alliance partners (the 
governance dimension of the alliance portfolio) decreases its propensity to form new alliances 
with novel partners, consistent with the organizational inertia perspective (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977; Kim, Oh, and Swaminathan, 2006). By examining how firms simultaneously change these 
alliance- and partner-level attributes in response to performance feedback, we complement prior 
studies that have focused on the determinants of distinct portfolio dimensions in isolation (e.g. 




specifically, we advance the understanding of alliance portfolio dynamics by proposing that 
decisions concerning portfolio technological scope and partner mix are made jointly (cf. 
Wassmer, 2010 p.164) and, therefore, are likely to share common antecedents. We also 
contribute to performance feedback theory by offering a theoretical explanation for the 
difference in the nature and type of risk-taking occurring when performance is below or above 
aspirations. Finally, we are among the first to highlight how inertia may play a role in the 
performance feedback cycle that shapes alliance portfolio reconfiguration. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Below-aspiration performance and alliance portfolio reconfiguration 
Performance below aspirations triggers “problemistic search”, a goal-oriented behavior 
focused on solving an organizational problem so as to raise performance to the firm’s aspiration 
level (Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal and March, 1981). When performance is slightly below 
aspirations, a firm will search for solutions “near the problem symptom or the current activities” 
(Greve, 2003a p.56) in order to achieve small improvements necessary to improve performance. 
However, when performance is far below aspirations, the likelihood that appropriate solutions to 
an organizational problem are found locally decreases, forcing firms to consider more risky, 
exploratory search behaviors instead (Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 2003a). Problemistic search in 
response to performance below aspirations has been observed in a wide range of organizational 
behaviors and settings (for an integrative review see Greve, 2003a). From the innovation 
performance point of view, problemistic search corresponds to organizational actions which can 
improve firms’ innovation output and increase it to the aspired level. While innovation output is 




2012), we focus on the latter because our goal is to examine firms’ alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration choices as a result of their search behaviors in response to performance feedback.  
Problemistic search in response to a negative discrepancy between aspired and realized 
innovation performance motivates firms to modify their strategies and assumptions about their 
R&D efforts, to address performance problems. As alliances constitute important elements of a 
firm’s innovation efforts, below-aspiration innovation performance is likely to lead firms to 
make more risky but potentially more rewarding choices about technological scope and partner 
choice, two factors that are recognized by the literature to influence the innovation outcomes of 
alliances, in their newly formed alliances with respect to the technological scope and partner mix 
of their existing alliance portfolios.  
When deciding on the technological scope in a newly formed alliance, a firm performing 
below its aspirations faces two risky alternatives: On the one hand, focusing on a technological 
area in which the firm has already an alliance in its existing alliance portfolio means investing in 
a potentially promising area that has failed to generate a satisfactory level of innovation output. 
On the other hand, focusing on a novel technological area may expose the firm to greater 
uncertainties both in terms of the eventual innovation outcomes and in terms of the time period 
needed to realize these outcomes (Pisano, 2006). While exploration of new technologies can 
enhance innovation performance in the long run, it is unlikely to result in the immediate 
performance improvements which problemistic search is expected to yield because exploratory 
R&D typically requires long lead times before starting to contribute to firms’ innovation 
performance (March, 1991; Greve, 2003a). Firms engaged in problemistic search however 
require more immediate performance improvements (Lehman et al., 2011), which are more 




areas. The problem-oriented nature of problemistic search is widely established in the literature. 
Levinthal and March (1981 p.309) for example state that “[problemistic] search emphasizes 
relatively immediate refinements in the existing technology, greater efficiency, and discoveries in 
the near neighborhood of the present activities.” We therefore suggest that, consistent with the 
literature on risk-taking (Greve, 2003b p.27), because focusing in new technological areas 
represents a higher-risk alternative to achieve immediate performance improvements with more 
uncertain returns, problemistic search will lead firms to form new alliances on their existing 
technological areas and seek solutions to performance problems within these areas.  
One such solution that firms may consider is to engage with alliance partners they are not 
currently collaborating with (e.g. Beckman et al., 2004; Baum et al., 2005; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 
2006). On the one hand, due to incomplete information about the reliability, motives, and 
capabilities of such novel partners, they present a risky and uncertain alternative compared to 
engaging existing partners (Baum et al., 2005). Moreover, firms may need time to develop 
patterns of interaction with novel partners (Zollo et al., 2002; Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009). 
On the other hand, novel partners have the potential to offer fresh perspectives on technological 
problems within the firm’s existing scope of activities, which may in turn help the firm reduce 
the discrepancy between innovation performance and aspirations. When performance is below 
aspirations, the perceived benefits of novel partners may thus outweigh the greater risk and 
uncertainty that such partners entail (Baum et al., 2005). Although establishing smooth 
relationships with novel alliance partners is a time-consuming process, a focal firm, due to its 
familiarity with the technological area covered by the alliance, may consider the relational 




improvements than the technological uncertainties and long lead times associated with exploring 
new technological areas 
These arguments suggest that below aspirations, firms become more likely to form 
alliances with novel partners, yet within the technological areas in which they operate, thus 
remaining within the technological scope of its alliance portfolio. This approach blends the 
opportunity for fresh perspectives associated with the engagement of novel alliance partners with 
the redundancy benefits of remaining within the technological scope of the existing alliance 
portfolio. Redundancy in technological scope across a firm’s existing and new alliances is likely 
to increase competition across its partners in these alliances, giving the firm the opportunity to 
play novel and existing partners against each other, while also attenuating partners’ opportunistic 
behaviors (Lavie, 2007). These benefits will together increase the likelihood that suitable 
solutions become available to the firm, and help the firm raise its performance toward its 
aspirations. Overall, therefore, we predict that in the failure range, firms will not reconfigure the 
technological scope of their alliance portfolios, while they will reconfigure their partner mix, by 
forming alliances with novel partners. 
Hypothesis 1: The further a firm’s innovation performance is below aspirations, the 
greater its propensity for the formation of alliances within the existing technological 
scope of that firm’s alliance portfolio with novel partners. 
The moderating role of alliance portfolio commitment 
Though Hypothesis 1 predicts an increase in the motivation for risky search when 
performance decreases relative to aspirations, the organizational inertia perspective (e.g. Hannan 




depending on the level of inertia implicated in a firm’s existing alliance portfolio (cf. Greve, 
2003a). One prevalent source of inertia is the scale of a firm’s involvement in the alliances 
within its existing portfolio (Kim et al., 2006) i.e. a firm’s monetary and organizational 
commitment to its existing alliances. A firm has a choice between relatively low-commitment 
alliances, such as contractual agreements, and high-commitment alliances, such as those 
containing minority equity investments and joint ventures (e.g. Gulati and Singh, 1998). We 
propose that a greater prevalence of high-commitment alliances within a firm’s existing 
portfolio, i.e., greater alliance portfolio commitment, induces inertia, making the firm inherently 
less likely to reconfigure its portfolio when innovation performance is below aspirations. 
Greater portfolio commitment means that a firm and its partners are more interdependent 
and the partners to whom a firm is more committed have a greater voice in the firm’s decision 
making process. Moreover, such voice is likely to be stronger when the firm engages in actions 
that may undermine the activities in alliances with such partners (Gimeno, 2004). A firm’s 
decision to engage novel partners within the existing portfolio’s technological scope represents a 
portfolio reconfiguration decision particularly likely to be perceived by a firm’s existing partners 
as cannibalizing the value of their alliances with the firm. Indeed, especially this competitive 
kind of alliance formation may “place explicit or implicit restrictions on the resources that a 
business devotes to older relationships” (Singh and Mitchell, 1996 p.102) and is likely to shift 
the balance of power between a firm and its partners in favor of the focal firm (Lavie, 2007). In 
this case, a firm’s existing partners have an incentive to respond negatively to the firm’s plans to 
reconfigure its alliance portfolio (Duysters and Lemmens, 2003), and such negative responses 




the failure range, the likelihood of portfolio reconfiguration will be affected by the level of a 
firm’s alliance portfolio commitment as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: When performance is below aspirations, the greater a firm’s alliance 
portfolio commitment, the smaller its propensity for the formation of alliances with novel 
partners within the existing technological scope of that firm’s alliance portfolio. 
Above-aspiration performance and alliance portfolio reconfiguration 
 When a firm’s innovation performance is above aspirations, the likelihood of 
problemistic search will decrease (Greve, 2003a). At the same time, above-aspiration 
performance is likely to increase the accumulation of organizational slack, which will in turn 
motivate “slack search” (Cyert and March, 1963; Singh, 1986). Innovation performance above 
aspirations may not only free employee time and capital, and relax coordination and control 
pressures (March 1994); it may also increase a firm’s ability to attract additional resources (e.g. 
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; Sood and Tellis, 2008). Moreover, recent successes may 
boost a firm’s confidence necessary to pursue actions with high potential pay-offs, but previously 
believed to be too risky (Baum et al., 2005). Taken together, when performance is above 
aspirations, accumulated slack may progressively motivate firms to explore new areas which 
may potentially yield profitable outcomes, rather than to engage in risky behaviors in areas that 
are related to any existing organizational problem. As a starting point, therefore, we propose that 
when performance increases relative to aspirations, firms will be more likely to engage in new 
alliances in technological areas beyond the scope of their existing alliance portfolio (Levinthal 




 While slack search will spark experimentation in novel technological areas, it is unlikely 
to be completely immune to pressures for managerial accountability (Cyert and March, 1963). 
We thus propose that while slack search may change the technological areas in which a firm 
engages in alliance activities, such change is less likely with respect to the partners it 
collaborates with. Above-aspiration performance implies that interactions with existing partners 
have been successful and, compared to the formation of new alliances with novel partners, 
alliance formation with existing partners is much less subject to concerns related to cooperative 
incentives and coordination challenges (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Zollo et al., 2002). Li and 
Rowley (2002), for example, find that firms are especially likely to renew alliances with existing 
partners if prior alliances with such partners were successful rather than unsuccessful, while 
Gulati et al. (2009) show that considerable cumulative abnormal returns accrue to firms 
announcing a new alliance with an existing partner. 
Though in the failure range firms may believe that the problem-specific benefits of novel 
partners outweigh the costs related to incentive and coordination issues, in the success range this 
may not be the case. In knowledge intensive industries in particular, the costs associated with an 
unjustified change in alliance partners may be especially steep, given the time involved both in 
negotiating an agreement and in developing the mutual trust and relational routines (Gulati, 
1995; Zollo et al., 2002) necessary to begin to engage in the exploration activities that slack 
search is expected to stimulate. The simultaneous reconfiguration of both the technological scope 
and partner mix of a firm’s alliance portfolio thus would appear to generate inherent managerial 
challenges and an exposure to perhaps excessive risk (Lavie et al., 2011), which may in turn lead 
relevant audiences, such as investors, to question the reliability and accountability of the firm 




aspirations, firms will reconfigure the technological scope of their alliance portfolios, but they 
will not reconfigure their partner mix. 
Hypothesis 3: The further a firm’s innovation performance is above aspirations, the 
greater its propensity for the formation of alliances with existing partners outside the 
existing technological scope of that firm’s alliance portfolio. 
Overall, our conceptual framework generates predictions on alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration that are jointly consistent both with the implications of performance feedback 
theory (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2003a) and with pressures on firms for reliability and 
accountability (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Building on the insight that the nature (i.e. 
problemistic or slack search) and domain (technological scope or partner choice) of search may 
be distinct depending on whether it is prompted by perceived failures or successes, we predict 
that a firm reconfigures its alliance portfolio’s partner mix but not technological scope below 
aspirations, while reconfiguring its portfolio’s technological scope but not partner mix above 
aspirations. Therefore, when performance moves from the failure to the success range, our theory 
predicts that firms will refocus their risky search behavior from the partner domain toward the 
technology domain. 
While our predictions only focus on alliance portfolio reconfiguration through new 
alliance formations in existing technological areas with new partners and in new technological 
areas with existing partners, these portfolio reconfiguration scenarios are not exhaustive. It could 
be argued for example that firms performing significantly below aspirations would form 
alliances with new partners in novel technological areas (thus engaging in risky search in both 




alliances with existing partners in their existing technological areas (thus refraining from risky 
behaviors in either domain). Following Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006), we however posit that 
simultaneous reconfiguration in multiple domains would generate a tension between the urge to 
access new knowledge that pressures firms toward forming alliances in new technological areas 
and with new partners (e.g. Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008), and organizational inertia (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984) that impels firms toward forming alliances in existing technological areas 
and with existing partners. We therefore suggest that, as a result of a balance between these 
conflicting organizational pressures, firms will limit their risky search behavior to either 
technology or partner mix domains of their alliance portfolios (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; 
Lavie et al., 2011), and present a behavioral perspective explaining when and why they 
configure either domain. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample and data collection 
We test our hypotheses on a sample of listed U.S. biotechnology firms engaged in 
alliances during 1981-2000. Although many large pharmaceutical firms as well as some food and 
agricultural firms have been involved in biotechnology since its emergence in the late 1970s, the 
central players in this industry are dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs; Powell, 1996; Pisano, 
2006). To share the costs and reduce the risks of drug development, DBFs actively engage in 
collaborations with each other as well as with large pharmaceutical firms (Stuart, Hoang, and 
Hybels, 1999; Pisano, 2006). Because of high capital requirements, large numbers of potentially 




important role for the success and survival of DBFs (Pisano, 2006; van der Valk, Moors, and 
Meeus, 2009). These firms therefore constitute an ideal setting for our study. 
 Following Gulati and Higgins (2003) and Higgins and Gulati (2006), we obtain our 
initial sample of public U.S.-based DBFs from the BioWorld Stock Report for Public 
Biotechnology Companies in 2001. This listing solely includes DBFs and excludes large 
corporations with primary activities outside of biotechnology, thus constituting an appropriate 
data source for our study. We then identify all alliances formed by these firms between 1981 and 
2000 using the Recombinant Capital (RECAP) database, which is commonly used for research in 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries as it includes in-depth information such as press 
releases and legal contracts for alliances and acquisitions. We collect further data on our sample 
firms from their annual reports, from COMPUSTAT, and from U.S. patent information to 
measure their performance and aspiration levels from the NBER Patent Data Project (Hall, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg, 2001). 
Because our key interest is in estimating models of alliance portfolio reconfiguration, 
rather than portfolio configuration per se, we use information on alliance formation during 1981-
1984 to construct initial alliance portfolios for all sample firms that formed alliances during this 
time window. In so doing, we also alleviate concerns of left-censoring. We subsequently update 
firms’ alliance portfolios annually using this rolling four-year window, assuming that alliances 
formed by a firm in a given year continue to exist some years into the future. Our choice of 
focusing on alliances four years preceding an observation year is consistent with prior research, 
which generally considers five years to be the average period in which an alliance contributes to 




After excluding firms that underwent corporate restructuring during our sampling period, 
and those with missing data on one or more of the variables, we obtain a final panel dataset 
comprised of 185 DBFs for a total of 1,138 firm-year observations. This dataset form the basis 
for our empirical models predicting alliance portfolio reconfiguration in the years from 1985 to 
2000. The panel is unbalanced, reflecting a substantial increase in the number of DBFs entering 
into alliances during the sampling period (e.g. Powell et al., 2005; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 
2006). Because our estimation procedure excludes firms with no non-zero entries on the 
dependent variable, our models include between 189 and 988 firm-year observations, determined 
by each dependent variable.  
Dependent variables 
We specify our dependent variables so as to capture both the nature of the technological 
areas (i.e. existing within a firm’s alliance portfolio or novel) and the nature of the partners (i.e. 
existing or novel) in a firm’s newly formed alliances in a given year. We generate three pairs of 
dependent variables to enable us to perform a stepwise assessment of our hypotheses. Two pairs 
of dependent variables capture the change in alliance portfolio technological scope and partner 
mix separately. The third pair captures combinations of the two. 
The first pair of dependent variables captures the change in alliance portfolio 
technological scope. The RECAP database lists all technological areas (such as monoclonals, 
recombinant DNA and transgenics), if applicable, that are covered in alliances recorded in the 
database. In total 53 distinct technological areas are covered by the alliances in our dataset. To 
construct our dependent variables measuring technological scope, we compare for each firm in 




technological areas covered by its alliances in four years preceding the focal year (its alliance 
portfolio). Specifically, Alliances in existing technologies measures the number of a focal firm’s 
alliances formed in the year t+1 which only focus on such technological areas that are already 
covered by that firm’s existing alliances in its alliance portfolio. Similarly, Alliances in novel 
technologies measures the number of a focal firm’s alliances formed in the year t+1 which focus 
on at least one technological area that is not covered by that firm’s existing alliances in its 
alliance portfolio.  
The second pair of dependent variables captures the nature of the partners in a firm’s 
newly-formed alliances. Specifically Alliances with existing partners measures the number of a 
focal firm’s alliances formed in the year t+1 with its existing alliance partners. Similarly, 
Alliances with novel partners measures the number of a focal firm’s alliances formed in the year 
t+1 with novel alliance partners.  
Since our hypotheses predict a simultaneous change in alliance portfolio technological 
scope and partner mix, we construct a third pair of dependent variables that captures the changes 
in these areas simultaneously. Alliances in existing technologies with novel partners measures 
the number of a focal firm’s newly-formed alliances in year t+1 with novel alliance partners 
which only focus on technological areas that are already covered by that firm’s existing alliance 
portfolio (within its alliance portfolio technological scope). We test H1 with this dependent 
variable. To test H2, we interact this variable with the Alliance portfolio commitment variable. 
Our last dependent variable Alliances in novel technologies with existing partners measures the 
number of a focal firm’s newly-formed alliances in year t+1 with its existing alliance partners 




portfolio (outside of its alliance portfolio technological scope). We test H3 with this dependent 
variable.  
Independent variables 
We construct our independent variables as the difference between a focal firm’s actual 
innovation performance in year t and its performance aspiration levels. We rely on the patenting 
activities of the DBFs in our sample to calculate their innovation performance and to construct 
their historical and social aspiration levels. Patents have the potential to protect competitive 
advantage in biotechnology because they offer effective intellectual property protection 
necessary for firms to bring novel technologies to market (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen, Nelson, and 
Walsh, 2000). Some observers even note that “the biotechnology industry would not have 
emerged but for the existence of predictable patents” (Federal Trade Commission, 2003). 
Moreover, prior studies show that biotechnology firms with more patents attract more financing 
and go to IPO faster (Stuart et al., 1999; Baum and Silverman, 2004), while they also achieve 
higher market valuations once they are publicly traded (Hall et al., 2005 p.32; Sood and Tellis, 
2008). Consistent with these observations, numerous studies examining the alliance activity in 
biotechnology has based measures of innovation performance on counts of patents (e.g. Baum, 
Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; 
Whittington, Owen-Smith, and Powell, 2009).  
More traditional accounting-based performance measures, such as return on assets or 
return on sales, are likely to be less useful as a consistent anchoring point in biotechnology 
because DBFs tend not to achieve sales or returns until considerable resources have been 




loose connection between the technological and product-market productivity in biotechnology, 
patents appear to be the more relevant performance measure, especially in relation to firms’ 
immediate-term decisions concerning the reconfiguration of their alliance portfolios. 
To construct our independent variables, we first calculate historical and social 
performance aspiration levels of our sample firms for the observation years. Following prior 
research (Levinthal and March, 1981; Greve, 2003a; Baum et al., 2005; Bromiley and Harris, 
2014), we calculate historical aspiration levels based on an exponentially weighted average of 
historical performance values as follows: 
Historical Aspirationit = (1-a) * (a * Pit-2 + Pit-1) 
where i is a subscript for firms; t is a time subscript; P is the number a focal firm’s successful 
patent applications in year t, and the updating parameter α is the weight attached to the prior 
performance level Pt-2 relative to new performance information Pt-1. We chose α = 0.35 as the 
value for the updating parameter because this value provided the best fit of the model to our data 
(Bromiley and Harris, 2014). This relatively low value for α indicates that sampled firms placed 
a greater weight on new performance information relative to that conveyed by the prior 
aspiration level. Such a finding is consistent with the idea that more recent performance 
information may be seen as comparatively more relevant in dynamic settings such as 
biotechnology. Moreover, given that our sampled firms are all public, it may also reflect the fact 
that investor pressures lead firms to update their performance aspirations more quickly, by 
anchoring their aspiration levels in more recent rather than more remote historical performance. 
 We calculate social aspiration levels based on the average patenting performance of other 




Social aspirationit = (∑jPjt)/Nt , 
where Pjt is the number of patents granted to a publicly traded DBF j in year t, and Nt is the 
number of other publicly traded DBFs in year t. Our measure restricted social comparison to 
other publicly traded DBFs, reflecting the idea that compared to private firms, other publicly 
traded firms are especially relevant to the focal firm as reference points. Moreover, patent grant 
dates rather than application dates are more suitable from a social comparison perspective, first, 
because patent applications are not made public until at least 18 months from the original 
application date, and in a variety of cases they are not made public until patents are granted 
(USPTO, 2012). Second, information on other firms’ patenting should be particularly relevant to, 
and reliable for, the performance comparison process once patents are known to have been 
granted. 
 After we calculate performance aspiration levels, we separately construct two pairs of 
independent variables (based on historical and social aspiration levels) for below and above 
aspiration performance by using spline functions to allow performance relative to aspirations to 
have different effects above and below the aspiration levels (Greve, 2003a). 
 Performance-Historical aspiration < 0 equals performance minus the aspiration level 
when performance is below the historical aspiration level, and equals 0 when performance is at 
or above this level.  
 Performance-Historical aspiration > 0 equals performance minus the aspiration level 
when performance is above the historical aspiration level, and equals 0 when performance is at 




Performance-Social aspiration < 0 equals performance minus the aspiration level when 
performance is below the social aspiration level, and equals 0 when performance is at or above 
this level.  
 Performance-Social aspiration > 0 equals performance minus the aspiration level when 
performance is above the social aspiration level, and equals 0 when performance is at or below 
the historical aspiration level.  
 Our moderator variable, Alliance portfolio commitment measures the share of all alliances 
in a focal firm’s existing alliance portfolio that include minority equity investments and/or were 
joint ventures.  
Control variables 
 We employ a number of control variables at the firm and alliance portfolio level (as of 
year t) that may affect firm’s alliance formation decisions. At the firm level, we control for 
organizational slack as it represents organizational resources available for search via external 
collaborations and may impact a firm’s search behavior (e.g. Greve, 2003a). Following prior 
research, we measure Absorbed slack by the ratio of a firm’s selling and administrative expenses 
to the number of its employees, and Unabsorbed slack by the ratio of a firm’s cash and short 
term investments to its liabilities (Greve, 2003a). Other firm-level controls include Firm age, 
which captures a focal firm’s age in years since incorporation. Firm profits, which measures a 
focal firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Firm size, 
which equals the natural logarithm of a firm’s number of employees, and Firm R&D spending, 




 At the alliance portfolio level, Alliance portfolio size measures the number of alliances in 
a firm’s alliance portfolio. The variable Technologies in alliance portfolio captures the share of 
all 53 technologies listed in the RECAP database that were covered in a firm’s alliance portfolio. 
Two additional variables capture the characteristics of the alliances in a focal firm’s alliance 
portfolio: Alliances with commercialization component measures (in percentage points) the share 
of a firm’s alliances that include a commercialization provision for the outcome of the alliance, 
while Alliances with R&D component measures the share of a firm’s alliances (in percentage 
points) that explicitly designate R&D as a major activity in the alliance. 
 Finally, in addition to firm fixed-effects, all models include fixed effects for the multi-
year periods 1985-1987, 1988-1990, 1991-1993, and 1994-1996, while 1997-2000 is the baseline 
category. We choose this partitioning of years into multi-year periods because both yearly fixed 
effects and fixed effects for two-year periods generated considerable multicollinearity, while the 
estimates on both alternative sets of temporal fixed effects were largely insignificant. 
Empirical analysis 
 All our six dependent variables are nonnegative count variables, we therefore employ a 
Poisson quasi maximum likelihood estimation with conditional firm fixed effects (Wooldridge, 
1999) to empirically test our hypotheses. This method accommodates autocorrelated error terms 
and overdispersion and is robust to conditional heteroscedasticity. A conditional fixed effects 
specification generates unbiased and consistent estimates, though it discards firms that only have 
values of zero on the dependent variable (e.g. Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984; Allison and 
Waterman, 2002)). Therefore, depending on the specific dependent variable, effective sample 




unconditional fixed effects estimations, we also estimate all models on the full sample of 1,357 
firm-years (200 firms) using OLS fixed effects estimation. This generated virtually identical 
results across the different hypothesis tests. 
 RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Tables 1 presents descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations among our variables. We 
examined the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of our variables to check whether some 
moderately high correlations among our explanatory variables may cause a collinearity problem 
in our regressions. All VIFs are below the commonly accepted threshold of 10, suggesting that 
our estimations are not affected by multicollinearity among independent variables (Studenmund, 
2010).  
Our sample reflects the commonly accepted characteristics of biotechnology firms as 
being relatively young, small, R&D-intensive firms with usually negative returns. The average 
firm in our sample is 10 years old, has 237 employees and records a loss (before interest, taxes 
and depreciation) of 150,000 USD while spending approximately 25 million USD for R&D 
annually, While six firms, formed between 1987 and 1997, entered our dataset two years after 
formation, the two oldest firms in the sample, Lifecore Biomedical Inc. and Oxis International 
Inc., both formed in 1965, were founded before the inception of biotechnology as an industry in 
late 1970s but subsequently focused their main activities in this industry. The largest sample firm 
measured by the number of employees is Chiron Corp. with 7,434 employees in 1997. Although 
167 out of 185 firms in our sample did not generate positive financial earnings during the time 




earnings of 1.67 billon USD before interest, taxes and depreciation in 1999, while spending 822 
million USD for R&D, also the highest in our sample.  
Our sample firms also exhibit a high degree of variation in terms of their alliance 
formation patterns. While the average sample firm has 4.4 alliances in its alliance portfolio, half 
of which are explicitly formed to conduct R&D, the firm with the largest number of alliances in 
its alliance portfolio is Affymetrix Inc., with 46 alliances in 2000, 35 of which are specifically 
formed to conduct R&D. The most common alliance formation behavior in our sample is 
formation of alliances with novel partners (1.28 per year), followed by alliances in firms’ 
existing technological areas (0.8 per year). Each year in our dataset, the average sample firm 
forms 0.7 alliances in its existing technological areas with novel partners and 0.02 alliances in 
novel technological areas with its existing alliance partners. The firm with the greatest number of 
alliances in existing technologies in any focal year is Affymetrix Inc. which formed 17 such 
alliances in 1998, 15 of which were with novel partners. Chiron Corp. has the greatest number of 
alliances in novel technologies in any focal year with 8 such alliances in 1995, all of which are 
with novel partners. Although on average 17 percent of our sample firms’ alliance portfolios 
consist of equity alliances (alliances with minority equity investments or joint ventures), the 
alliance portfolios of 20 firms in our sample solely consist of equity alliances. On average seven 
percent of alliances in our sample firms’ alliance portfolios include explicit provisions for 
commercialization of drug candidates, indicating the nascent stage of biotechnology industry 






Table 1 – Descriptive statistic and pairwise correlations 
   Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Alliances in existing technologies 0.783 1.552 0 17 1.000         
(2) Alliances in novel technologies 0.531 0.963 0 8 0.255 1.000        
(3) Alliances with existing partners 0.102 0.361 0 3 0.520 0.256 1.000       
(4) Alliances with novel partners 1.276 1.875 0 17 0.851 0.675 0.382 1.000      
(5) Alliances in existing technologies with novel partners 0.707 1.400 0 15 0.982 0.246 0.372 0.858 1.000     
(6) Alliances in novel technologies with existing partners 0.024 0.158 0 2 0.053 0.252 0.420 0.091 0.063 1.000    
(7) Performance-Historical aspiration > 0 2.509 9.441 0.000 193.962 0.195 0.182 0.289 0.194 0.167 0.231 1.000   
(8) Performance-Social aspiration > 0 3.409 14.598 0.000 260.574 0.311 0.264 0.351 0.320 0.278 0.210 0.907 1.000  
(9) Performance-Historical aspiration < 0 -0.979 6.203 -147.530 0.000 -0.241 -0.116 -0.014 -0.255 -0.268 -0.040 0.042 -0.103 1.000 
(10) Performance-Social aspiration < 0 -3.788 3.064 -9.573 0.000 0.127 0.125 0.102 0.138 0.118 0.047 0.274 0.289 -0.065 
(11) Perf.-Hist. asp. < 0 * Alliance portfolio commitment -0.272 2.301 -58.890 0.000 -0.184 -0.102 0.001 -0.203 -0.205 -0.009 0.031 -0.093 0.909 
(12) Perf.-Social asp. < 0 * Alliance portfolio commitment -0.551 1.271 -9.573 0.000 0.012 0.029 0.033 0.022 0.008 0.016 0.095 0.101 0.010 
(13) Absorbed slack 73.372 79.317 2.867 1,300.500 -0.062 0.019 -0.053 -0.033 -0.060 -0.040 -0.059 -0.052 0.018 
(14) Unabsorbed slack 5.647 8.604 0.000 136.167 -0.101 -0.099 -0.062 -0.124 -0.100 -0.031 -0.040 -0.065 0.027 
(15) Firm age 10.099 5.066 2 34 0.024 0.064 0.018 0.048 0.022 -0.007 0.018 0.068 -0.072 
(16) Firm profits* -0.150 92.795 -165.509 1,637.700 0.079 0.191 0.019 0.157 0.082 -0.009 0.101 0.213 -0.095 
(17) Firm size 237.207 625.183 1 7,434 0.373 0.346 0.211 0.438 0.378 0.168 0.385 0.576 -0.403 
(18) Firm R&D spending* 24.815 62.432 0.000 822.800 0.321 0.335 0.180 0.395 0.318 0.077 0.346 0.550 -0.280 
(19) Alliance portfolio size 4.366 5.224 0 46 0.679 0.326 0.462 0.631 0.652 0.160 0.306 0.453 -0.236 
(20) Technologies in alliance portfolio (%) 0.056 0.060 0.000 0.491 0.565 0.372 0.349 0.571 0.553 0.158 0.347 0.492 -0.239 
(21) Alliances with commercialization component (%) 0.074 0.171 0.000 1.000 0.029 0.038 0.016 0.038 0.029 0.010 0.028 0.033 -0.035 
(22) Alliance portfolio commitment 0.165 0.250 0.000 1.000 0.053 0.071 0.038 0.071 0.050 0.019 0.063 0.067 -0.071 
(23) Alliances in the portfolio with R&D component (%) 0.490 0.392 0.000 1.000 0.217 0.147 0.153 0.228 0.210 0.068 0.093 0.105 -0.041 
All correlations above 0.06 are significant at 0.05 level 





Table 1 – Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (continued) 
   (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
(10) Performance-Social aspiration < 0 1.000              
(11) Perf.-Hist. asp. < 0 * Alliance portfolio commitment -0.059 1.000             
(12) Perf.-Social asp. < 0 * Alliance portfolio commitment 0.385 0.079 1.000            
(13) Absorbed slack -0.238 0.016 -0.074 1.000           
(14) Unabsorbed slack 0.027 0.018 0.010 0.005 1.000          
(15) Firm age -0.089 -0.069 0.062 0.052 -0.156 1.000         
(16) Firm profits 0.111 -0.075 0.049 0.037 -0.046 0.157 1.000        
(17) Firm size 0.241 -0.323 0.089 -0.043 -0.125 0.198 0.672 1.000       
(18) Firm R&D spending 0.258 -0.267 0.068 -0.015 -0.108 0.177 0.739 0.850 1.000      
(19) Alliance portfolio size 0.180 -0.189 0.033 -0.080 -0.139 0.084 0.207 0.557 0.490 1.000     
(20) Technologies in alliance portfolio (%) 0.217 -0.190 -0.022 -0.107 -0.146 0.081 0.320 0.636 0.592 0.832 1.000    
(21) Alliances with commercialization component (%) 0.074 -0.096 -0.297 -0.068 -0.006 -0.018 -0.007 0.041 0.059 0.065 0.110 1.000   
(22) Alliance portfolio commitment 0.096 -0.167 -0.652 -0.066 -0.012 -0.113 0.012 0.053 0.095 0.058 0.162 0.442 1.000  
(23) Alliances in the portfolio with R&D component (%) 0.157 -0.067 -0.265 -0.183 0.044 -0.148 0.034 0.091 0.103 0.293 0.354 0.339 0.444 1.000 
All correlations above 0.06 are significant at 0.05 level/ 




In Tables 2 and 3 we separately present the results of alliance portfolio technological 
scope and partner mix analyses, respectively. Table 4 estimates the models with the same 
independent variables but with simultaneous reconfiguration of technological scope and partner 
choice as dependent variables, with which we test our hypotheses. Note that the independent 
variables measuring below-aspiration performance are constructed such that they take greater 
negative values as performance decreases further below aspirations. Therefore, negative 
coefficients of Performance-Historical aspiration < 0 and Performance-Social aspiration < 0 
variables imply a positive effect on the dependent variables. 
Alliance portfolio technological scope 
In Table 2, Model 1 shows that firms’ alliance formations in their existing technological 
areas increase as their innovation performance falls below their historical aspiration levels, and 
decrease when their performance exceeds these levels. Model 2 shows that while performance 
above social aspiration levels has a negative effect on alliance formations in existing 
technologies, performance below social aspirations does not have any effect. Together, these 
results are in line with H1. While Model 3 shows that performance relative to historical 
aspiration levels has no significant effect on alliance activity in novel technological areas, Model 
4 shows that performance above social aspirations is conducive to formation of alliances in novel 





Table 2 – Fixed-effects models of alliance portfolio technological scope 
 Alliances in existing technologies  Alliances in novel technologies 
 1 2  3 4 
Absorbed slack 0.001 0.001  0.003** 0.003** 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Unabsorbed slack -0.020** -0.021*  -0.031*** -0.033*** 
(0.010) (0.011)  (0.012) (0.012) 
Firm age 0.073* 0.056  -0.003 -0.010 
(0.039) (0.042)  (0.060) (0.062) 
Firm profits -0.001*** -0.001***  0.001** 0.001** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.147 0.228  0.162 0.153 
(0.142) (0.143)  (0.240) (0.238) 
Firm R&D spending 0.037 0.016  0.189 0.194 
(0.090) (0.096)  (0.177) (0.178) 
Alliance portfolio size -0.031*** -0.031***  -0.013 -0.013 
(0.009) (0.010)  (0.032) (0.032) 
Technologies in alliance portfolio 6.369*** 6.562***  -5.487** -6.219** 
(1.435) (1.380)  (2.771) (2.833) 
Alliances with commercialization 
component 
-0.266 -0.382  -0.223 -0.207 
(0.428) (0.442)  (0.450) (0.443) 
Alliance portfolio commitment -0.656** -0.564**  0.029 0.004 
(0.282) (0.279)  (0.375) (0.367) 
Alliances in the portfolio with R&D 
component 
0.977*** 0.983***  -0.393 -0.376 
(0.323) (0.332)  (0.303) (0.297) 
Performance-Historical aspiration > 0 -0.002*   0.004  
(0.001)   (0.003)  
Performance-Social aspiration > 0  -0.003***   0.006** 
 (0.001)   (0.003) 
Performance-Historical aspiration < 0 -0.005*   -0.001  
(0.002)   (0.002)  
Performance-Social aspiration < 0  0.013   0.003 
 (0.028)   (0.027) 
Observations 792 792  937 937 
Log-likelihood -682.3 -683.8  -652.1 -650.1 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 







Alliance portfolio partner mix 
 In Table 3, Models 1 and 2 show that above-aspiration performance relative to both 
historical and social reference points positively influences the formation of new alliances with 
existing alliance partners, consistent with H3. Models 3 and 4 test the effects of performance 
relatable to aspirations on alliance activities with novel partners, and show that performance 
below historical (but not social) aspirations lead to formation of new alliances with novel 
partners, in line with H1. Models 5 and 6 add the interaction of below-aspiration performance 
with alliance portfolio commitment. Model 5 shows that although firms performing below their 
historical aspirations increase their propensity to form new alliances with novel partners, this 
propensity is curtailed by their equity commitments to their existing alliance partners. This result 
is in line with H2. Like Model 4, Model 6 reports no significant effect of performance relative to 
social aspirations on alliance formations with novel partners. 
Alliance portfolio technological scope and partner mix 
 In Table 4 Models 1 through 6 report the results of analyses of simultaneous change in 
alliance portfolio technological scope and partner mix. Although the results provided by the 
previous analyses that separately examine changes in technological scope and partner choice are 
consistent with our predictions, these models with dependent variables that simultaneously 
capture both dimensions of alliance portfolio reconfiguration allow for a more rigorous testing of 
our hypotheses.  
 Models 1 and 2 show that above-aspiration performance relative to both historical and 
social reference points is conducive to alliance formation in novel technological areas with 




Table 3 – Fixed-effects models of alliance portfolio partner mix 
 Alliances with existing partners  Alliances with novel partners 
 1 2  3 4 5 6 
Absorbed slack 0.002 0.002  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(0.004) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unabsorbed slack -0.055** -0.054**  -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
(0.027) (0.027)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Firm age 0.078 0.098  0.037 0.021 0.038 0.021 
(0.117) (0.112)  (0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.034) 
Firm profits -0.002** -0.002**  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size -0.004 -0.100  0.175* 0.205* 0.154 0.205* 
(0.325) (0.322)  (0.104) (0.120) (0.105) (0.119) 
Firm R&D spending 0.425* 0.448*  0.060 0.051 0.070 0.051 
(0.253) (0.251)  (0.079) (0.085) (0.079) (0.085) 
Alliance portfolio size 0.001 -0.000  -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.029*** 
(0.019) (0.020)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Technologies in alliance portfolio 1.736 1.332  2.006* 2.144** 1.861* 2.163** 
(2.492) (2.668)  (1.026) (1.091) (1.049) (1.092) 
Alliances with commercialization 
component 
-0.618 -0.455  -0.300 -0.350 -0.324 -0.344 
(0.846) (0.853)  (0.292) (0.296) (0.300) (0.296) 
Alliance portfolio commitment -1.244* -1.398**  -0.133 -0.089 -0.105 -0.044 
(0.700) (0.695)  (0.213) (0.215) (0.217) (0.273) 
Alliances in the portfolio with R&D 
component 
2.103** 2.098**  0.079 0.070 0.079 0.070 
(0.821) (0.835)  (0.211) (0.209) (0.211) (0.208) 
Performance-Historical aspiration > 0 0.006***   -0.002  -0.002  
(0.002)   (0.001)  (0.001)  
Performance-Social aspiration > 0  0.007***   -0.002  -0.002 
 (0.002)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Performance-Historical aspiration < 0 0.012   -0.004**  -0.010***  
(0.008)   (0.002)  (0.003)  
Performance-Social aspiration < 0  -0.020   -0.000  -0.003 
 (0.056)   (0.017)  (0.022) 
Perf.-Hist. asp. < 0 × Alliance 
portfolio commitment 
     0.020**  
     (0.010)  
Perf.-Social asp. < 0 × Alliance 
portfolio commitment 
      0.016 
      (0.071) 
Observations 422 422  988 988 988 988 
Log-likelihood -152.8 -152.9  -1010 -1012 -1009 -1012 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 





Table 4 – Fixed-effects models of alliance portfolio technological scope and partner mix 
 Alliances in novel technologies 
with existing partners 
 
Alliances in existing technologies with novel 
partners 
 1 2  3 4 5 6 
Absorbed slack -0.013** -0.015**  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.006) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unabsorbed slack -0.109* -0.121**  -0.020** -0.020** -0.020** -0.020** 
(0.057) (0.061)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Firm age -0.174 -0.140  0.056 0.036 0.059 0.032 
(0.273) (0.273)  (0.042) (0.046) (0.042) (0.046) 
Firm profits 0.002 0.002  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.007) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size -1.279* -1.394**  0.154 0.256 0.103 0.275* 
(0.693) (0.671)  (0.153) (0.159) (0.158) (0.160) 
Firm R&D spending 0.762** 0.788**  0.012 -0.013 0.035 -0.025 
(0.339) (0.356)  (0.101) (0.108) (0.103) (0.109) 
Alliance portfolio size 0.211** 0.225***  -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.033*** 
(0.097) (0.086)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Technologies in alliance portfolio -18.750** -21.926***  6.558*** 6.873*** 6.333*** 6.778*** 
(7.535) (7.905)  (1.369) (1.317) (1.416) (1.319) 
Alliances with commercialization 
component 
-0.088 -0.286  -0.218 -0.358 -0.277 -0.419 
(2.647) (2.565)  (0.441) (0.467) (0.452) (0.459) 
Alliance portfolio commitment 0.894 1.161  -0.589** -0.474* -0.538* -0.857** 
(1.684) (1.476)  (0.288) (0.280) (0.294) (0.369) 
Alliances in the portfolio with R&D 
component 
0.331 0.710  0.852*** 0.854** 0.846** 0.864** 
(1.271) (1.412)  (0.330) (0.338) (0.332) (0.340) 
Performance-Historical aspiration > 0 0.028***   -0.003**  -0.002*  
(0.005)   (0.001)  (0.001)  
Performance-Social aspiration > 0  0.025***   -0.004***  -0.004*** 
 (0.006)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Performance-Historical aspiration < 0 -0.013   -0.005**  -0.016***  
(0.010)   (0.002)  (0.003)  
Performance-Social aspiration < 0  0.166   0.013  0.037 
 (0.148)   (0.029)  (0.034) 
Perf.-Hist. asp. < 0 * Alliance 
portfolio commitment 
     0.033***  
     (0.010)  
Perf.-Social asp. < 0 * Alliance 
portfolio commitment 
      -0.142 
      (0.102) 
Observations 189 189  792 792 792 792 
Log-likelihood -38.68 -37.99  -653.6 -655.2 -652.4 -653.8 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 





Figure 1 – Above-aspiration performance and new alliance formation 
 
Models 3 and 4 show that while performance below historical (but not social) aspiration 
levels positively influences alliance formation with novel partners in existing technological 
areas, as predicted by H1, the impact of above-aspiration performance relative to both historical 
and social reference points on this type of alliance activity is negative. Overall, our analyses 
provide support to H1.  
 Model 5 tests the impact of alliance portfolio commitment on formation of alliances with 
novel partners in existing technological areas as a response to performance below historical 
aspirations. The estimates show a negative impact of equity commitments to existing alliance 
partners on this type of alliance activity. This finding confirms and refines our previous analysis 
(Table 3 Model 5), and provides support to H2. Figure 2 illustrates the curtailing impact of 
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existing technologies. Model 6 reports no significant impact of performance relative to social 
aspirations on alliance formations with novel partners in existing technologies. 
Figure 2 – Interaction between performance below historical aspirations and alliance 
protfolio commitment 
 
Overall, our analyses of changes in alliance portfolio technological scope and partner 
mix, examined separately as well as simultaneously, support our hypotheses. While we generally 
find that above-aspiration performance relative to historical and social aspiration levels have 
similar effects on alliance portfolio decisions, we find no significant effect of performance below 
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evaluate their successes by internal as well as external standards. Research in this area suggests 
that when managers view their firms as comparable to others, they tend to evaluate their 
performance by external standards, but they prefer internal criteria when they view their firms as 
different than others (Greve, 2003b; Audia and Greve, 2006). In our empirical context, the 
biotechnology industry, both viewpoints can be justified. On the one hand, all biotechnology 
firms are similar in that they pursue drug R&D with unconventional methods using a limited set 
of business strategies (Pisano, 2006). On the other hand, each drug R&D project is unique and 
shares little common ground for problem-solving with others. It is therefore likely that while 
biotechnology firms may consider obtaining more patents than other biotechnology firms as an 
indication for success (as it is an intuitive and easily quantifiable performance indication), they 
may not be evaluating obtaining fewer patents than others as a failure, as long as they meet their 
internal performance criteria. 
DISCUSSION 
 In this study we examine how firms reconfigure their alliance portfolios as a result of 
their innovation performance relative to aspirations, and find that below-aspiration performance 
motivates firms to form new alliances in their existing technological areas yet with novel 
partners, whereas above-aspiration performance leads them to form new alliances in novel 
technological areas with their existing alliance partners. We further find that equity commitments 
to existing alliance partners reduces firms’ propensity to form new alliances in existing 
technological areas with novel partners. Before proceeding to theoretical and managerial 
implications of our findings, we would like to elaborate on our application of performance 




the context of innovation performance and its possible consequences for the generalizability of 
our results. 
Performance feedback theory is based on the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and 
March, 1963) which argues that “managers compare expected firm performance to aspiration 
levels that depend on prior aspirations, prior performance, and the performance of comparable 
firms.” (Bromiley and Harris, 2014 p.338). Researches using performance feedback theory to 
explain various organizational decisions (e.g. Greve, 2003a; Audia and Greve, 2006), mostly 
relied on accounting-based performance indicators such as return on assets, return on equity, and 
return on sales to measure firm performance relative to aspirations. Accounting-based 
performance measures are well-suited to empirically test predictions based on performance 
feedback theory because firms are mostly evaluated by shareholders, creditors and other 
stakeholders based on such performance measures. Applying performance feedback theory to the 
context of innovation performance relies on the assumption that managers compare their actual 
innovation output with prior periods as well as with the innovation output of comparable firms, 
and modify their search behaviors based on these comparisons. While the impact of innovation 
performance on firms’ search behaviors is not as strongly established in prior research as that of 
accounting performance, we believe that in our empirical context (the biotechnology industry) 
innovation performance is more likely to influence firm behavior than accounting-based 
performance measures because the overwhelming majority of biotechnology firms have never 
generated financial profits, and innovation performance is the most important performance 
metric by which our sample firms are evaluated. (Pisano, 2006 p.118) 
While there are a few profitable biotechnology firms such as Amgen and Genentech, the 




development into financial returns. Because of the high degree of uncertainty and long-lead 
times in drug R&D, biotechnology is a unique industry in which the majority of firms can be 
expected to sustain prolonged periods of financial losses (Pisano, 2006 p.118). Despite the lack 
of prospects for short-term financial gains, biotechnology firms are considered as viable 
investments by a wide range of investors, and as attractive alliance partners by large 
pharmaceutical firms, because of high potential returns when their innovative efforts will lead to 
commercially viable drugs. Due to high capital requirements of drug R&D and the need to access 
complementary assets via alliances, maintaining the interest of investors and potential alliance 
partners is of vital importance for biotechnology firms. Hence, these firms need to convince 
potential investors and alliance partners that they have the necessary R&D capabilities to convert 
financial resources (investments) to drugs (Pisano, 2006 p.118) by exhibiting an adequate level 
of innovation performance. We therefore suggest that biotechnology firms would continuously 
adjust their strategies, including their search behaviors, so as to maintain an adequate level of 
innovation performance, since this is the most feasible way for these firms to sustain their 
viability as economic entities in the absence of financial profits in the short-run. While the 
connection between innovation performance and search behaviors may be weaker in more 
established industries in which counting performance measures better reflect long-term 
profitability, we believe that our conceptual framework and empirical findings are relevant to 
emerging, high-technology industries in which firms’ economic viability depends on successful 
commercialization of scientific breakthroughs. 
Contributions to the literature 
We make several contributions to the literature. First, we complement the scarce body of 




of firms` alliance portfolio expansion decisions (Parise and Casher, 2003; Hoffmann, 2007; 
Wassmer, 2010; Wassmer and Dussauge, 2012; Lahiri and Narayanan, 2013). Existing research 
in this area largely focuses on how firms can improve their competitive position by using their 
alliance portfolios as a strategic tool, implicitly assuming that firms make alliance formation 
decisions rationally to enhance the alignment between their alliance portfolios and their strategic 
objectives. Our results underscore the behavioral aspect of alliance formation decisions by 
showing that managers make such decisions not only based on long-term strategic goals but also 
as a response to short-term stimuli such as performance feedback. Our results thus help explain 
why in many cases alliance portfolios evolve to a “random” collection of individual alliances 
rather than to purposefully designed strategic tools (Bamford and Ernst, 2002; Kale and Singh, 
2009).  
Second, our results refine the relationship between problemistic and slack-driven search 
as a result of performance relative to aspirations on the one hand, and risk-taking on the other. A 
large body of literature suggest that both problemistic and slack-driven search are increasingly 
associated with risk-taking as performance diverges from aspiration levels (e.g. Cyert and 
March, 1963; Greve, 2003a; Baum et al., 2005). Although the difference between the drivers of 
problemistic and slack-driven search (addressing an existing problem for the former and 
experimentation with resources for the latter) point at a possible difference between the domains 
in which problemistic and slack-driven search take place, these studies do not make a distinction 
between the type and nature of risk-taking associated with these search behaviors.  Specifically, 
while problemistic search is more likely to focus on the existing area of expertise of a firm, 
slack-driven search allows a firm to expand its area of expertise. Our findings confirms this 




scope of their alliance portfolios and alter their resource configurations (by allying with new 
partners) to address performance problems whereas firms performing above aspirations keep 
their alliance partners and expand the technological scope of their alliance portfolios. In other 
words, firms in the failure range change their “toolbox” to improve their performance, firms in 
the success range use their existing “toolbox” for their exploration activities in novel areas.  
Our results support the view that managers’ alliance formation decisions are prone to 
cognitive biases (Cannon, 2005; Edmondson, 2011). Our analysis suggests that managers 
attribute poor performance to their alliance partners and believe that performance would improve 
if they ally with “better” partners”. Similarly, above-aspiration performance implicitly confirms 
managers’ choices of alliance partners. In addition, our results suggest that problemistic search 
requires a shorter time-frame to obtain positive results than slack-driven search (Greve, 2003a). 
Lehman et al. (2011) find that as the time between a decision and the realization of its 
consequences decreases, decision makers’ expectations of quicker results from their actions 
increases. While firms engaged in problemistic search aim to obtain performance improvements 
by the next performance feedback point (one year in our study), firms engaged in slack-drive 
search can afford longer trajectories for their exploration activities as they do not face an 
imminent threat of failure. When exploration in new technological areas is time-consuming and 
highly uncertain, as is the case in many high-technology industries such as biotechnology 
(Pisano, 2006), managers of firms in the failure range might consider an alliance with a novel 
partner that might provide new solutions to their existing problems as a more feasible short-term 
solution (Beckman et al., 2004; Li et al., 2008). Conversely, managers of firms in the success 




specific assets with their current alliance partners (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Beckman et al., 2004; Baum 
et al., 2005) to engage in exploration activities.  
Previous studies show that inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) resulting from 
embeddedness in existing partnership networks reduces uncertainty associated with known 
alliance partners, and that past investments in relationship-specific assets makes firms insensitive 
to potentially beneficial cooperation opportunities with novel alliance partners (Li and Rowley, 
2002; Duysters and Lemmens, 2003; Hagedoorn and Frankort, 2008). Our findings confirm and 
refine the relationship between inertia and alliance partner selection. On the one hand, in the 
presence of negative performance feedback, firms increase their propensity to ally with novel 
partners despite the costs and risks of doing so. Our findings thus show that performance 
feedback is a powerful factor that helps firms overcome inertial forces in favor of change. On the 
other hand, equity commitments to existing alliance partners weaken this relationship, suggesting 
that contractual inertial forces are more powerful than social pressures. A fruitful direction for 
future research is to investigate the performance implications of the role of inertia in restricting 
firms’ ability to respond to negative performance feedback by means of alliances with novel 
partners.  
Our findings also have implications for research on alliance portfolio diversity. While 
numerous studies examine the impact of different dimensions of alliance portfolio diversity on 
firm performance (e.g. Baum et al., 2000; Lavie, 2007; Jiang et al., 2010; Duysters et al., 2012; 
Van de Vrande, 2013), the understanding of the antecedents of such diversity remains limited. 
Our findings suggest that below-aspiration performance increases the diversity of alliance 
partners within alliance portfolios whereas above-aspiration performance increases technological 




align with the role of alliance portfolios as strategic tools, a fruitful direction for future research 
can be to examine whether the drivers of alliance portfolio diversity (strategic positioning or 
performance feedback) influence the established relationships between alliance portfolio 
diversity and firm performance.  
Managerial implications 
Our results, combined with prior research on alliance portfolios, underscore the need that 
managers should be self-reflective in their alliance decisions. Specifically, managers should 
consider the portfolio-level consequences of forming new alliances with novel partners (thus 
increasing the partner diversity of their alliance portfolios), or in novel technological areas (thus 
increasing their portfolio’s technological diversity) to address short-term performance problems. 
While partner diversity within alliance portfolios can potentially improve the overall value of the 
portfolio to a firm, it also places a substantial burden on the firm’s alliance management 
capability (Sarkar, Aulakh, and Madhok, 2009; Duysters et al., 2012). Therefore, when a firm 
lacks a well-developed alliance management capability, the addition of a new alliance with a 
novel partner to the portfolio as a consequence of poor performance can decrease the value that a 
firm can extract not only from that alliance but also from its already existing alliances. Similarly, 
increasing technological diversity within an alliance portfolio can decrease performance 
outcomes of exploration activities in distant technological areas (Vasudeva and Anand, 2011), 
suggesting that performance outcomes from slack-driven search by means of a new alliance 







KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION OR COMPLEMENTARY 
SPECIALIZATION? ANTECEDENTS OF ALTERNATIVE KNOWLEDGE 
UTILIZATION OUTCOMES IN ALLIANCES 
ABSTRACT 
Research about external knowledge utilization through alliances suggests that firms 
can more successfully utilize their alliance partners’ knowledge when their 
technological capabilities overlap with those of their partners and when they have 
prior experience in alliances. This research however largely focuses on knowledge 
acquisition from alliance partners as the main knowledge utilization strategy in 
alliances, ignoring alternative strategies such as complementary specialization, 
which allows alliance partners to specialize in complementary areas without seeking 
to acquire each other’s knowledge. In this paper we compare the impact of 
technological overlap and alliance experience on these two knowledge utilization 
strategies. We argue that technological overlap enhances firms’ knowledge 
recognition skills and is conducive to complementary specialization within an 
alliance, whereas alliance experience improves knowledge assimilation skills and is 
conducive to inter-partner knowledge acquisition. Our empirical analysis on a multi-
industry sample of 971 alliances supports our predictions.  
 







The surge in the rate of technological innovation in the last three decades has motivated 
many firms to increase their use of strategic alliances to augment and upgrade their technological 
capabilities (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Hagedoorn and Wang, 2012). In view of these 
developments, researchers have extensively studied how firms can benefit from technological 
capabilities of their alliance partners. While acquiring knowledge from alliance partners is 
emphasized as the key benefit to partnering firms of alliances, (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 1998; 
Dussauge et al., 2000; Inkpen and Tsang, 2007), alliances also allow partnering firms to jointly 
apply their complementary knowledge bases toward a commercial outcome by specializing in 
their distinct but related areas. (Nakamura et al., 1996; Lubatkin et al., 2001; Mowery et al., 
2002; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). The goal of these alliances is complementary 
specialization (CS), rather than knowledge acquisition (KA) (Nakamura et al., 1996; Mowery et 
al., 2002; Inkpen and Tsang, 2007), because each alliance partner focuses on its own area of 
expertise. Although they are less common than KA alliances, CS alliances play an important role 
in the development and commercialization of large-scale, technology-driven projects. Prominent 
examples include the alliance between Daimler and SMH (the producer of Swatch watches) to 
design and produce the Smart car, as well as the Airbus consortium, whose members specialize 
in the design and production of specific parts of Airbus aircrafts.  
Although CS alliances form an efficient strategy for innovation and are frequently used in 
many high-technology settings, such as aircraft engineering (Mowery et al., 2002; Inkpen and 
Tsang, 2007), the automotive industry (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004), information technology 
(Lubatkin et al., 2001), and biotechnology (Al-Laham, Amburgey, and Baden-Fuller, 2010), very 




this managerial relevance, increasing our understanding of CS alliances is of key importance 
given the impact of new knowledge creation (Jiang and Li, 2009) and cost-benefit trade-offs 
(Duso, Pennings, and Seldeslachts, 2009) on the innovation outcomes and sustainability of 
alliances. Unlike KA alliances, which facilitate the transfer of existing knowledge between 
alliances partners and frequently initiate “learning races” between them (Khanna et al., 1998), 
CS alliances facilitate the creation of new knowledge and promote cooperative rather than 
competitive behavior, increasing the efficiency and sustainability of collaboration.  
Over the past several years, academic alliance research has focused largely on KA in 
alliances, thereby ignoring the role of other important knowledge utilization strategies, such as 
CS, in facilitating innovation outcomes. In the only empirical study investigating the antecedents 
of CS in alliances, Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (2002) demonstrate that technological overlap 
between alliance partners enhances both KA and CS in alliances. Although the authors present 
an interesting finding that technological overlap, traditionally associated with KA (e.g. Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990; Mowery et al., 1996; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Schildt, Keil, and Maula, 
2012), is also conducive to CS, the empirical limitations of their study prevent a thorough 
understanding of the  mechanisms that connect the antecedents ıf external knowledge utilization 
to its outcomes in the form of KA or CS.   
This paper seeks to provide a more thorough analysis of the factors that are likely to 
influence KA and CS in alliances by extending the study of Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman 
(2002) in two important ways. First, we focus on multiple antecedents of knowledge utilization 
that affect different sets of capabilities enabling firms to utilize external knowledge. In addition 
to technological overlap, which enhances firms’ recognition and evaluation of their alliance 




Mowery et al., 2002), we analyze the role of alliance experience as a determinant of  firms’ 
external knowledge utilization capabilities, since such experience improves firms’ abilities to 
acquire know-how from external sources (Sampson, 2005; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). 
Second, rather than using the divergence of technological capabilities of alliance partners as a 
proxy for CS, as has been done in previous work (Mowery et al., 2002), we employ a new 
measure that takes both the relative distance and the technological complementarity between 
alliance partners’ capabilities into account. Our analyses of 971 alliances suggest that 
technological overlap is more conducive to CS than to KA, while alliance experience has a 
stronger relationship to KA than to CS. Given the limited empirical evidence on CS in alliances 
(Mowery et al., 1996; Lubatkin et al., 2001; Mowery et al., 2002; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; 
Inkpen and Tsang, 2007), we contribute to the existing literature by exploring how such factors 
that are recognized to influence external knowledge utilization impact CS, in comparison to KA, 
in alliances. Our findings also provide guidance to managers in terms of their policy decisions 
regarding the utilization of external knowledge.  
This paper proceeds as follows. After we briefly review the literature on learning and 
knowledge utilization in alliances, we develop hypotheses to be tested. We then describe our data 
and methods. The empirical results are presented in the section after that. We conclude with a 
discussion of the results and their implications.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 Knowledge utilization in alliances: Prior research 
Spurred by a realization of the increasing importance, from the early 1980s on, of 




investigating how firms benefit from collaborating with other firms. Early research in this area 
suggests that firms can improve their competitiveness by collaborating with competitors for the 
purpose of acquiring skills and capabilities underlying their competitive advantages (Hamel et 
al., 1989; Hamel, 1991). The idea of enhancing competitiveness by transferring knowledge from 
alliance partners is not surprising since alliances provide partnering firms with access to one 
another’s capabilities (Inkpen, 1998; Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002) and coordination and 
cooperation mechanisms that enable knowledge transfer (Mowery et al., 1996; Inkpen and 
Tsang, 2007). Consequently, researchers focused their attention on identifying the factors that 
influence knowledge acquisition from alliance partners (e.g. Khanna et al., 1998; Larsson et al., 
1998; Dussauge et al., 2000; Inkpen and Tsang, 2007).  
 The coordination and collaboration mechanisms provided by alliances also allow firms to  
pool their complementary capabilities and work together toward a joint commercial outcome, 
thereby sharing the costs and reducing the risks of innovation (Inkpen and Tsang, 2007). These 
alliances allow partnering firms to more specifically target their innovative efforts by 
specializing in their respective areas of expertise, rather than trying to internally replicate each 
other’s knowledge, which leads to CS within the alliance (Nakamura et al., 1996; Mowery et al., 
2002). CS increases the efficiency of innovation because it allows firms to access and utilize new 
capabilities without being exposed to the costs and uncertainties associated with their acquisition 
(Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004).  
Researchers have used various theoretical perspectives to study knowledge utilization in 
alliances, such as the absorptive capacity approach (Mowery et al., 1996, 2002), the exploration 
and exploitation framework (e.g. Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Colombo, 




1996; Hennart and Zeng, 2005), and organizational learning (e.g. Hamel et al., 1989; Powell, 
Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Inkpen and Tsang, 2007). While some of these studies recognize 
CS as a viable knowledge utilization strategy, they generally focus on KA as the main (and often 
sole) benefit of alliances to partnering firms. Because of the differences in terms of strategic 
goals and knowledge exchange processes between KA and CS alliances (Lubatkin et al., 2001; 
Mowery et al., 2002; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Lui, 2009), the findings regarding the 
inducements and obstacles to KA in alliances have limited applicability to CS. As a result, the 
theoretical insights and empirical evidence regarding the antecedents of CS remain rather scant. 
With the exception of Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (2002), who showed that technological 
overlap, as measured by reciprocal patent citations among alliance partners, enhances both KA 
and CS in alliances, no scholar, to our knowledge, has empirically compared the antecedents of 
KA and CS, which leaves this area of study open for potential contribution.  
Technological overlap and knowledge utilization 
Technological overlap between two or more firms exists when these firms have 
overlapping technological knowledge bases i.e. sets of knowledge that they demonstrated 
familiarity with, or mastery of (Ahuja and Katila, 2001 p.201). Within an alliance, technological 
overlap enhances partnering firms` understanding of the meaning and value of each other’s 
technological knowledge bases, and provides them with “absorptive capacity” to recognize and 
ultimately assimilate each other’s knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998). While the absorptive capacity argument suggests that technological overlap leads to KA 
in alliances, it can also allow alliance partners to access and benefit from each other’s knowledge 
without assimilating it by facilitating the development of mechanisms for combining their 




The literature provides empirical evidence that supports both viewpoints. While Mowery, Oxley 
and Silverman (1996, 1998, 2002) find a significant and positive relationship between alliance 
partners` technological overlap before and after alliance formation, suggesting that pre-alliance 
technological overlap leads to inter-partner knowledge transfers, hence KA, during the course of 
the alliance, they also show that technological overlap is also conducive to CS (Mowery et al., 
2002). Below we compare the role of technological overlap in alternative knowledge utilization 
strategies, KA and CS, in alliances. 
Because new knowledge needs to be understood before it can be utilized, an accurate 
understanding and evaluation of alliance partners’ knowledge is essential for KA, as well as for 
CS. Therefore, technological overlap enhances both of these knowledge utilization strategies 
(Mowery et al., 2002). For KA, however, evaluation of partner knowledge needs to be followed 
by its assimilation, which requires internalizing the know-how associated with that knowledge. 
As suggested by the early literature on knowledge utilization, merely knowing about external 
knowledge does not automatically give a firm the ability to internally replicate and use it: the 
firm also needs to know how to use the external knowledge, an understanding it can gain by 
participating in the application of that knowledge (for a discussion see Brown and Duguid, 2001 
p.203-204). In line with these arguments, absorptive capacity research (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998) suggests that for knowledge transfer to take place, partnering 
firms in an alliance need to establish knowledge-sharing mechanisms that facilitate interactions 
between their personnel. These mechanisms are essential for KA because a significant part of 
technological knowledge is embedded in firm-specific processes (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Lane 
and Lubatkin, 1998) and can only be acquired through interactions between the individuals 




manufacturers such as GM were familiar with the principles of Japanese “lean manufacturing”, 
GM was only able to benefit from lean manufacturing after forming the NUMMI alliance with 
Toyota that allowed for intensive interactions between GM and Toyota engineers (Inkpen, 2008). 
These arguments suggest that for KA to take place in an alliance, understanding how an alliance 
partner applies its capabilities is as important as understanding their meaning and value (Brown 
and Duguid, 2001). Therefore, while pre-existing technological overlap can enhance the 
assimilation of an alliance partner’s knowledge, it in itself is not sufficient for facilitating KA 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). 
In contrast, an accurate understanding of the meaning and commercial usefulness of an 
alliance partner’s capabilities is sufficient for CS because in CS alliances, acquisition of partners’ 
knowledge is neither required nor desired (Lubatkin et al., 2001:1367). Instead, partnering firms 
in such alliances direct their efforts toward specializing in their own technological areas to 
contribute to the joint alliance outcome, rather than internalizing each other’s knowledge. As 
Lubatkin, Florin, and Lane (2001 p.1367) put it, “The participating firms need only learn enough 
about the other’s knowledge to appreciate how to best link and leverage their respective 
competencies.” Pre-existing technological overlap can provide partnering firms in CS alliances 
with the necessary understanding about the nature and commercial potential of each other’s 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 p.136), as well as about how their complementary 
knowledge bases can be combined and commercially exploited (Mowery et al., 2002). Based on 
the above arguments, we hypothesize that pre-existing technological overlap is more conducive 
to CS than to KA in alliances.  
Hypothesis 1: Technological overlap is more strongly associated with complementary 




Alliance experience and knowledge utilization 
Besides technological overlap, alliance experience is another factor recognized by the 
literature to enhance a firm`s ability to effectively utilize external knowledge as it improves a 
firm`s know-how acquisition skills by exposing it to diverse sources of external knowledge 
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Zollo et al., 2002; Kale and Singh, 2007). Prior experience with a 
diverse set of alliance partners leads to a greater ability to develop shared inter-organizational 
routines that enable know-how transfer between alliance partners (Zollo et al., 2002; Hoang and 
Rothaermel, 2005). Moreover, alliance experience improves firms’ alliance management 
capabilities and facilitates better coordination with partners, which enhances inter-partner know-
how transfers (Kale et al., 2002; Sampson, 2005; Kale and Singh, 2007). The development of 
intra- and inter-organizational routines which enable firms to better manage their alliances and 
assimilate their alliance partners` knowledge in turn increases the speed with which firms learn 
in subsequent alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000), and facilitates easier exchange of knowledge 
and technology (Sampson, 2005; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). In addition to know-how 
acquisition skills, alliance experience increases firms` opportunities to access and utilize external 
know-how. Firms with high levels of alliance experience are considered desirable alliance 
partners (Dyer and Singh, 1998), which implies that such firms have advantageous access to their 
partners’ capabilities and associated know-how. Overall, these findings suggest that firms with a 
high degree of alliance experience can manage their future alliances better and face lower 
barriers to knowledge transfer from their alliance partners. 
As we explain above, acquiring knowledge from alliance partners requires acquiring the 
associated know-how (Brown and Duguid, 2001). A primary reason that many American firms 




opportunities to interact with them and observe how they applied their knowledge, was that they 
focused mostly on what their Japanese partners knew but neglected “how and why they knew 
what they knew” (Inkpen, 1998 p.74). While participating in the application of external 
knowledge is necessary for assimilating the know-how associated with it (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Inkpen, 2008; Janowicz-Panjaitan and Noorderhaven, 2008, 2009), it is not sufficient in 
itself, because the learning firm also needs to accurately analyze and interpret its learning 
experiences and create mechanisms for their internal application and diffusion. In the NUMMI 
alliance, for instance, GM initially struggled to benefit from the learning experiences of GM 
managers assigned to NUMMI because “although these managers were learning as individuals, 
many became frustrated when they reentered GM because they were unable to implement the 
ideas they had learned from NUMMI. Within GM there was significant resistance to the Toyota 
production system (TPS) and a lack of understanding as to how GM could benefit from lean 
manufacturing” (Inkpen, 2008 p.449). Only after a new top management team that actively 
supported learning from NUMMI took over and established mechanisms for systematically 
processing, codifying, and internally diffusing the knowledge transferred from NUMMI was GM 
able to internally apply, and benefit from, that lean manufacturing knowledge.  
The above arguments suggest that a firm’s know-how acquisition skills are determined by 
its awareness of the know-how associated with that external knowledge, along with its ability to 
systematically process its interactions with external knowledge sources and establish 
mechanisms that enable the internal diffusion and application of new knowledge. By increasing 
firms’ awareness of their alliance partners’ know-how, enhancing their ability to develop shared 




experience improves firms’ know-how acquisition skills and can enable firms in KA alliances to 
acquire the know-how associated with their partners’ capabilities and internally replicate it.  
As summarized above, alliance experience enhances knowledge utilization in subsequent 
alliances by improving alliance management capabilities and reducing the barriers to knowledge 
transfer between alliance partners. While both of these benefits are relevant for KA alliances, 
only the former is applicable to CS alliances, because of the limited importance of knowledge 
transfer for CS. Knowledge exchange in CS alliances is only required for coordinating the 
alliance-related activities of partnering firms, so that they can be combined toward a joint 
commercial outcome (Lubatkin et al., 2001; Lui, 2009). In CS alliances, partnering firms have 
neither the incentive nor the requirement to share their know-how with each other. In fact, 
knowledge exchange between partnering firms may be explicitly precluded in the design of CS 
alliances, enabling partnering firms to protect their know-how (Mowery et al., 2002). Because of 
the relatively limited applicability of the benefits of alliance experience in CS alliances, we 
hypothesize that the experience of partnering firms in previous alliances is more conducive to 
KA than to CS in alliances.  
Hypothesis 2: Alliance experience is more strongly associated with knowledge 
acquisition than with complementary specialization in alliances. 
Thus far, we have argued that technological overlap is more conducive to CS and alliance 
experience is more conducive to KA in alliances. Since both technological overlap and alliance 
experience are important determinants of firms` external knowledge utilization abilities, we 
propose that they do not affect the outcomes of external knowledge utilization independently of 




how transfer, it may enhance the efficiency of know-how-transfer mechanisms in KA alliances 
for at least two reasons. First, technological familiarity reduces the time and effort, and hence the 
cost, of evaluating alliance partners’ knowledge (Kim and Inkpen, 2005). Thus, firms with 
overlapping technological capabilities can benefit more from their interactions with their alliance 
partners since they can use these opportunities to understand the more subtle aspects of their 
partners’ knowledge, rather than having to understand its meaning. Second, familiarity with the 
technological aspects of an alliance partner’s knowledge implies familiarity with the logic and 
assumptions underlying that partner’s capabilities (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Such familiarity 
can improve firms’ understanding of the know-how associated with alliance partners’ 
capabilities since it enables them to better comprehend “how and why their partners know what 
they know” (Inkpen, 1998 p.74). Thus, we suggest that as technological overlap between alliance 
partners increases, the relationship between alliance experience and KA becomes stronger. 
Hypothesis 3: Technological overlap positively moderates the relationship between 
alliance experience and knowledge acquisition in alliances. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and data sources 
 We drew our sample of alliances from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. 
SDC collects alliance-related information from publicly available sources, has tracked alliances 
since the early 1990s, and provides one of the major databases used by researchers to study 
alliances (Schilling, 2009). Following the literature on technology-driven interfirm collaboration 
(e.g. Mowery et al., 1996; Colombo et al., 2006; Nooteboom et al., 2007; Hoang and 




capabilities. Patents reflect R&D capabilities and provide a disaggregated measure for tracking 
capability development as a result of strategic choices, such as alliance participation (Mowery et 
al., 1996). Therefore, a firm’s patent portfolio can be seen as a reflection of its technological 
capability portfolio. We obtained patent data from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) (Hall et al., 2001), which provides data on patents and patent citations for all patents 
granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office from 1976 to 2006. We obtained financial data 
for our sample firms from the Compustat database.  
To construct our sample, we identified in the SDC database two-partner alliances formed 
from 1996 to 2000 (five years) for which the partners and their ultimate parents were included in 
the NBER database as patent assignees. Focusing on alliances between patent-holding firms 
provides a setting in which the utilization of external technological knowledge through KA and 
CS is important. Requiring that the ultimate parents be patent assignees provides a control for the 
possibilities that technological capabilities diffuse through corporate entities and are shaped by 
the patents in the entire corporate structure (Mowery et al., 1996).  
A total of 1,647 alliances in as many as 49 two-digit SIC codes
1
 were recorded in the 
SDC database for our sampling period, with patent data for the partnering firms and their 
parents. Of these, 1,072 were formed in four industries: chemicals; electronic equipment; 
business services; and engineering, accounting, and management services.
2
 In order to limit 
industry-specific influences, we focused on alliances in these four industries, which accounted 
for 65 percent of all alliances during our sampling period. After excluding 97 alliances that had 
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 SDC assigns an SIC code to each alliance based on the nature of the alliance activity.  
2




missing financial or patent information and four alliances formed between partners under the 
same corporate structure, we tested our hypotheses on a sample of 971 alliances. 
Dependent variable 
 Our categorical dependent variable Alliance type takes the value of 0 for alliances that 
exhibit neither KA nor CS, 1 for those that exhibit CS, and 2 for those that exhibit KA. We used 
the technological similarity measure developed by Jaffe (1986) to measure KA and CS in 
alliances, based on the correlation between the patent portfolios of alliance partners and 
calculated with the following formula:
3
 
Pij = FiF`j / [(FiFj) (Fji)]
 ½
, 
where Pij is the technological similarity between two patent portfolios, Fi is the vector of 
technological capabilities for Firm i, and Fj is the vector of technological capabilities for Firm j. 
The vector F is represented by (F1, F2, F3….Fk), where Fk is the number of patents in NBER 
patent class k. 
This similarity measure ranges from 0 to 1, such that 0 represents complete dissimilarity 
and 1 represents complete overlap between the two patent portfolios. We then subtracted the 
similarity values from 1 to calculate the technological distance between two patent portfolios 
(Vasudeva and Anand, 2011). For each alliance, we calculated and compared the technological 
distance between the patent portfolios of partnering firms’ as of one year before and five years 
after the alliance formation to determine how their technological capabilities developed with 
respect to each other in the course of the alliance. A decreasing technological distance after the 
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 In 100 of the alliances in our sample, one of the alliance partners did not have any patents prior to the alliance. In 
these cases, we assumed a pre-alliance technological distance of 1. We repeated our analyses by excluding these 




alliance formation signifies convergence between the partners’ technological capabilities and is 
an indicator of knowledge spillovers (Jaffe, 1986) and KA (Nakamura et al., 1996). 
Consequently, alliances in which the technological distance between the partners’ patent 
portfolios decreased after the alliance formation are classified as KA alliances. 
Measuring CS was a more challenging task because of the multidimensional nature of the 
construct. While an increasing technological distance between the partners’ patent portfolios 
after the alliance formation indicates a divergence of technological capabilities and the absence 
of KA (Nakamura et al., 1996; Mowery et al., 2002), we performed an additional analysis using 
the complementarity measure developed by Makri, Hitt, and Lane (2010) to evaluate whether 
this divergence unfolded in a complementary or random way. Following Makri, Hitt, and Lane 
(2010), we measured the technological complementarity between partnering firms in a focal 
alliance by their patents in the same subcategory, but different patent classes. The US Patent and 
Trademark Office classifies patents into 417 three-digit classes. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
(2001) further aggregate these 417 classes into 37 subcategories and six main categories in the 
NBER Patent Data Project. Each class belongs to only one subcategory. We measured the degree 
of complementarity by the number of successful patent applications of alliance partners in the 
same subcategory but different classes, divided by their total number of successful patent 
applications. For each alliance, we separately computed the degree of complementarity between 
the pre-alliance patent portfolios of the alliance partners and their patent stock accumulated 
during the five years following the alliance formation. We classified alliances in which both the 
technological distance and the complementarity between the partners increased after the alliance 




In our sample, 645 alliances were classified as KA alliances and 121 as CS alliances. In 
the remaining 205 alliances, the post-formation developments of the partnering firms’ 
technological capability portfolios did not exhibit an observable pattern in terms of knowledge 
utilization through either KA or CS. In these alliances, the technological distance between 
alliance partners either did not change or increased without being accompanied by an increase in 
complementarity. Although knowledge exchange and utilization can also take place in alliances 
without being reflected in the development of technological capability portfolios, our rather 
conservative empirical approach did not allow us to determine the type and nature of knowledge 
utilization occurring in these alliances, so we classified them in the residual “other” category. 
Independent variables 
 Since our unit of analysis is a focal alliance, we constructed our independent variables at 
the alliance level. This approach is consistent with our conceptualization of KA and CS as 
alliance-level outcomes, as well as with previous research in this area (Mowery et al., 1996, 
2002). 
  Technological overlap We measured the overlap in technological capabilities between 
alliance partners by their reciprocal patent citations using the “cross-citation rate” measure 
developed by Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996, 1998). When a firm obtains a patent for a 
technological innovation, it cites all the previous patents on which that innovation is based 
(Mowery et al., 1996). The proportion of citations to a particular firm’s patents in a focal firm’s 
patents represents the degree to which the focal firm drew on the other firm’s knowledge to 
develop its technological capabilities. Therefore, to the extent two firms cite each other’s patents, 




alliance cross-citation rate variable was calculated with the following formula and expressed in 
percentage points for easier interpretation:  
Cross-citation rateAB = (Citations in Partner A’s patents to Partner B’s patents) / (Total 
citations in Partner A’s patents) + (Citations in Partner B’s patents to Partner A’s patents) / 
(Total citations in Partner B’s patents). 
Alliance experience We constructed the General alliance experience variable as the total 
number of alliances established individually by the partnering firms during the five years 
preceding a focal alliance. Using a five-year window to measure experience is consistent with 
prior research in this area (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). Five years is considered the average 
period during which the effects of an alliance impact a firm’s overall alliance experience 
(Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). To accurately assess the exposure of firms to diverse sources of 
external knowledge, we excluded multiple prior collaborations with the same partners from the 
general alliance experience count.  
Control variables 
 General alliance experience ratio To control for the possibility that firms with similar 
levels of alliance experience may be more likely to form an alliance and to account for the 
imbalance between the levels of alliance experience among partnering firms in a focal alliance, 
we included the variable General alliance experience ratio in our models, which is the ratio of 
the partners’ general alliance experience counts.  
 Partner-specific alliance experience We controlled for any prior collaboration experience 




(Zollo et al., 2002) and other relation-specific assets (Dyer and Singh, 1998). The Partner-
specific alliance experience variable is the number of alliances that the partnering firms in a 
focal alliance established with each other in the five years preceding the focal alliance, excluding 
the year of formation.  
Pre-alliance technological complementarity We controlled for path dependence in the 
complementary capability development with the Pre-alliance complementarity variable, which 
indicates in percentage points the degree of technological complementarity between the 
partnering firms in a focal alliance before they entered into the alliance. 
Alliance size Since large firms have more resources to devote to capability development 
and are likely to have more alliance experience (Kale et al., 2002), we controlled for alliance size 
by including the variable Alliance total assets, which is the natural logarithm of the combined 
total assets of the partnering firms in a focal alliance
4
 in the alliance formation year.  
Alliance governance form We controlled for the governance mode of a focal alliance 
because equity alliances allow for more interaction and opportunities for capability development 
than non-equity alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000). The Joint venture dummy binary control 
variable has a value of 1 if the alliance is a joint venture and 0 otherwise.  
Industry relatedness We controlled for non-technological overlaps of capabilities 
between the partnering firms in a focal alliance with the Same industry binary variable, which 
has a value of 1 if the partners have the same four-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise.  
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 We also tested our models by including a ratio of the partners’ total assets to control for size imbalances between 




International alliances We controlled for the challenges faced by firms that ally with 
international partners (Lavie and Miller, 2008) with the International binary variable, which is 
coded as 1 if the partners are from different countries and 0 otherwise.  
We took industry effects into account with dummy variables for each two-digit alliance 
SIC code. Lastly, we controlled for any possible effects specific to a given alliance-formation 
year by including dummy variables for these years.  
Empirical analysis 
 We used a multinomial logistic regression model with the “other” category as the 
baseline. It separately compared the effects of pre-alliance technological overlap and alliance 
experience on the likelihood of KA and CS occurring in an alliance. The Pre-alliance cross-
citation rate and General alliance experience variables were mean-centered to decrease the 
collinearity between their first- and second-order terms. We tested Hypothesis 3 with the 
interaction term between Pre-alliance cross-citation rate and General alliance experience. All 
models were estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Multinomial logistic 
regression relies on the assumption that the outcome alternatives are independent (Long and 
Freese, 2001), and this was both conceptually and empirically satisfied in our setting.
5
 Our 
sample of 971 observations also meets the sample-size requirements
6
 of the maximum-likelihood 
estimator used by logistic regression models (Long, 1997). 
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 We employed a likelihood-ratio test to confirm that the outcome variables were distinct from one another (Long 
and Freese, 2001). 
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 Maximum-likelihood estimation requires a sample of at least 100 observations; samples with more than 500 






Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations. To ensure that our 
estimation was not affected by multicollinearity among the predictor variables, we checked the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) of our variables. All VIFs are below the commonly accepted 
threshold of 10 (Studenmund, 2010). We therefore concluded that our results were not affected 
by multicollinearity. 
We begin by describing the salient features of our sample. Descriptive statistics suggest 
that we have a highly heterogeneous sample with respect to all variables. Pre-alliance cross-
citation rate ranges between 0 and 4.45 percent, with a mean of 0.19 percent and a standard 
deviation of 0.56 percent, suggesting that the pre-alliance degree of technological overlap 
between alliance partners varies highly across our sample. The combined alliance experience of 
partnering firms in our sample are between 0 and 515. The dyad with the largest combined 
alliance experience in our sample was formed between IBM and Motorola, Inc. in 1997. In 
addition to the two alliances these two firms had with each other, IBM participated in 368 other 
alliances and Motorola in 146 from 1992 to 1996, according to the SDC database. The relatively 
high standard deviation of Partner alliance experience ratio (0.248) compared to the mean 
(0.165) suggests that in many of our sample alliances partnering firms have a rather unbalanced 
levels of prior alliance experience. The mean of Partner specific alliance experience is 0.156, 
indicating that most of the alliances in our sample are novel-partner alliances for partnering firms 
(the partnering firms in 93 - out of 971 - alliances in our sample have a prior collaboration 




greatest number of prior collaborations was Hewlett Packard and Microsoft Corporation, with 
eight alliances with each other from 1992 to 1996. Pre-alliance complementarity ranges from 0 
to 100 percent, indicating a high variance in terms of prior knowledge base relatedness of 
alliance partners in our sample. Our dummy variables show that approximately 10 percent of our 
sample alliances are joint ventures, 21 percent are formed by firms having the same primary 4-
digit SIC code, and 28 percent are formed by firms from different countries.  
Regression results 
  Table 2 presents the results of multinomial logistic regressions. Model 1 includes control 
variables only, Model 2 includes the main effects of the independent variables Pre-alliance 
cross-citation rate and General alliance experience, Model 3 adds the interaction term between 
Pre-alliance cross-citation rate and General alliance experience to Model 2.  The control 
variables offer interesting insights. Pre-alliance complementarity is negatively and significantly 
associated with the likelihood of CS across all models. This finding implies that CS is more 
likely to occur among alliance partners with unrelated knowledge bases. This is in line with the 
consensus in the literature that alliances are instrumental in exploiting potential 
complementarities. Same industry is positive and significant for KA across all models, implying 





 Table 1 – Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix  
*Alliance type equals to 0 for alliances classified as “other”, 1 for CS alliances, and 2 for KA alliances. 
All correlations above 0.05 are significant 
  
 
Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Alliance type*     1.453     0.819     0.000     2.000 1.00 
         
(2) Pre-alliance cross-citation rate (%)     0.194     0.556     0.000     4.453 -0.02 1.00 
        
(3) General alliance experience    81.648   104.444     0.000   515.000 0.15 0.31 1.00 
       
(4) Partner alliance experience ratio     0.165     0.248     0.000     0.958 0.03 0.28 0.07 1.00 
      
(5) Partner specific alliance experience     0.156     0.656     0.000     8.000 0.06 0.23 0.39 0.26 1.00 
     
(6) Pre-alliance complementarity in %    19.504    19.334     0.000   100.000 0.07 -0.14 -0.03 0.02 0.01 1.00 
    
(7) Joint venture     0.102     0.303     0.000     1.000 -0.00 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.01 1.00 
   
(8) Same industry     0.214     0.410     0.000     1.000 0.02 -0.06 -0.18 0.01 -0.05 0.07 -0.08 1.00 
  
(9) International     0.284     0.451     0.000     1.000 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.13 -0.05 1.00 
 




H1 suggests that technological overlap has a statistically more significant impact on CS 
than on KA. In Models 2 and 3, the coefficient of Pre-alliance cross-citation rate is positive and 
significant for CS and insignificant for KA, supporting H1. We computed the predicted 
probabilities of the alliance type outcomes in order to more easily interpret our findings.
7 
The 
predicted probability of CS occurring in an alliance is 0.11 at the mean value of Pre-alliance 
cross-citation rate, 0.15 at one standard deviation above the mean, and 0.66 at the maximum 
value. The graph in Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between technological overlap, measured 
by Pre-alliance cross-citation rate, and the likelihood of CS in an alliance. 
Figure 1 - Technological overlap and the likelihood of CS with 95% confidence intervals 
 
                                                 
7
 We computed the predicted probabilities using the Margins command in Stata 11. This command returns the 
average predicted probability of an outcome by calculating the predicted probability for each observation in the 




H2 suggests that alliance experience has a statistically more significant impact on KA 
than on CS. In Models 2 and 3, the coefficient of General alliance experience is positive and 
significant for KA and insignificant for CS, supporting H2. The predicted probability of KA 
occurring in an alliance is 0.68 at the mean value of General alliance experience, 0.74 at one 
standard deviation above the mean, and 0.87 at the maximum value. The graph in Figure 2 
illustrates this relationship. 
Figure 2 - Alliance experience and the likelihood of KA with 95% confidence intervals 
 
H3 suggests that at high levels of technological overlap, the relationship between alliance 
experience and KA becomes stronger. In Model 3, the interaction term Pre-alliance cross.cit. 
rate X Gen. alliance exp. is insignificant for CS but negative and significant for KA. This result 




between alliance experience and the likelihood that the alliance culminates in KA becomes 
weaker, rather than stronger. We elaborate further on this in the discussion section. The graph in 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between alliance experience and the likelihood of an alliance 
culminating in KA at different levels of technological overlap.  
Figure 3 - Alliance experience and the likelihood of KA at different levels of technological 
overlap with 95% confidence intervals 
Supplementary analyses 
 We performed additional analyses to confirm the robustness of our results. First, we 
measured the effects of technological overlap and alliance experience on KA and CS in alliances 
using continuous measures and employing Tobit estimations. Second, we performed our 
empirical tests by including only KA and CS alliances in the sample and using a binary logit 




independent variables on the likelihood of CS against that of KA, rather than against the residual 
“other” category. Third, we reconstructed our technological overlap variable by using the 
proportion of alliance partners’ patents in the same patent classes to all of their patents as an 
alternative measure. This alternative measurement is based on the contention that if patents 
reflect technological capabilities, the ability to successfully patent in the same narrowly defined 
technological areas implies similar technological capabilities. Fourth, in order to exclude the 
possible effects of specific firms and dyads occurring multiple times in our data, and the 
possibility that our results were being driven by firm- and dyad-specific factors, we clustered the 
standard errors by partner firm and by dyad. We also performed our tests with the exclusion of 
dyads that had more than one alliance in our sampling period. Across all specifications our 
results remained robust.   
In addition, we tested our model by including the squared terms of our independent 
variables in our models to account for the possible effect of diminishing returns on the impact of 
technological overlap
8
 and alliance experience
9
 on CS and KA in Model 4. While the coefficient 
of Pre-alliance cross-citation rate squared is not significant for CS and KA, the coefficient of 
General alliance experience squared is negative and significant for KA, suggesting that the 
influence of general alliance experience on the likelihood of KA in an alliance is subject to 
diminishing returns. This implies that the benefits of general alliance experience for know-how 
acquisition decrease at higher levels of experience, which can be due to competency traps 
(Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Sampson, 2005) and the erroneous generalization of earlier 
                                                 
8
 As technological overlap increases, the partners’ knowledge bases can become increasingly similar, rather than 
complementary, which may decrease the feasibility of CS in an alliance. 
9
 Inappropriate generalization of know-how acquisition skills developed in prior alliances (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999) or participation in alliances with redundant gains (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005) may negatively 




experience (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). The inflection point for the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between alliance experience and the likelihood of KA occurs when General alliance 
experience equals 250. This is within the range of our data, and the partnering firms in 68 
alliances from our sample have a combined alliance experience greater than 250. 
Table 2 - Multinomial logistic regression predicting alliance type 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent variable CS KA CS KA CS KA CS KA 
General alliance 
experience ratio 
0.220 0.102 -0.175 0.237 -0.149 0.244 -0.234 0.161 
(0.475) (0.365) (0.531) (0.376) (0.532) (0.376) (0.551) (0.386) 
Partner-specific alliance 
experience 
0.494* 0.376 0.295 0.196 0.322 0.218 0.274 0.284 
(0.276) (0.255) (0.265) (0.234) (0.279) (0.245) (0.272) (0.235) 
Pre-alliance 
complementarity (%) 
-0.018*** 0.006 -0.014** 0.005 -0.013** 0.005 -0.013** 0.004 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Joint venture dummy 0.636* 0.063 0.600 0.119 0.601 0.100 0.554 0.083 
(0.356) (0.296) (0.368) (0.296) (0.366) (0.297) (0.365) (0.298) 
Same industry dummy 0.494* 0.432** 0.505* 0.466** 0.507* 0.470** 0.475 0.484** 
(0.300) (0.212) (0.302) (0.211) (0.301) (0.213) (0.306) (0.216) 
International dummy -0.168 -0.161 -0.089 -0.122 -0.089 -0.093 -0.113 -0.094 
(0.275) (0.201) (0.282) (0.203) (0.279) (0.200) (0.285) (0.203) 
LN (Alliance total 
assets)  
0.099 0.187*** 0.013 0.122** 0.028 0.105* 0.023 0.068 
(0.063) (0.045) (0.071) (0.055) (0.070) (0.054) (0.072) (0.055) 
Pre-alliance cross-
citation rate (%) 
  0.515** -0.190 0.550** 0.041 1.327** -0.603 
  (0.202) (0.223) (0.267) (0.257) (0.556) (0.431) 
General alliance 
experience 
  0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.004*** 4.24e-4 0.009*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Pre-alliance cross.cit. 
rate X Gen.alliance exp. 
    -0.000 -0.003**   
    (0.001) (0.001)   
Pre-alliance cross-
citation rate squared 
      -0.293 0.199 
      (0.215) (0.131) 
General alliance 
experience squared 
      -1.11e-6 -2.6e-5*** 
      9.74e-6) (7.54e-6) 
Constant -1.910* -2.445*** -0.531 -1.391 -0.790 -1.075 -0.657 -0.317 
(1.036) (0.721) (1.188) (0.898) (1.174) (0.890) (1.257) (0.938) 
Observations 971 971 971 971 
Log likelihood -797.57427 -785.48301  -771.047 
Wald Chi2 68.02*** 86.59***  131.81*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year and industry dummies. All 





In this paper we investigate the role of two factors that are recognized to influence firms` 
external knowledge utilization abilities, namely technological overlap and alliance experience, in 
facilitating KA and CS in alliances and find that they technological overlap enhances CS and 
alliance experience enhances KA. Contrary to H3, our results show that at high levels of 
technological overlap, alliance experience is less, rather than more, conducive to KA. A possible 
explanation for this surprising finding is that alliance partners sharing a high degree of 
technological overlap are more likely to be protective of the non-overlapping portion of their 
knowledge bases because they are likely to draw on the same technological areas to develop their 
commercial products. They may thus and may seek to prevent outbound knowledge spillovers to 
each other to avoid the exploitation of their knowledge-based assets and eventual cannibalization 
of their competitive positions in product markets (Hamel et al., 1989; Hamel, 1991; Dussauge et 
al., 2000). To avoid knowledge appropriation by their partners, firms in these alliances may 
explicitly restrict knowledge-exchange provisions when designing and executing their alliances 
(Mowery et al., 2002; Inkpen, 2008). Restricted opportunities to observe and ultimately 
assimilate know-how can prevent KA as an outcome in these alliances, even though partnering 
firms have developed know-how acquisition skills through previous alliances. This also suggests 
that CS is a more feasible knowledge utilization strategy in these alliances, which is consistent 
with our findings.  
Contributions to the literature 
We make several contributions to the literature. Most importantly, we contribute to the 




Oxley, and Silverman (2002) and providing a more thorough analysis of the relationship between 
antecedents of external knowledge utilization and its outcomes in the form of KA and CS in 
alliances. Our analysis also reinforces the viability of CS as an alternative external knowledge 
utilization strategy to KA (Inkpen and Tsang, 2007). While we acknowledge that CS alliances 
are completely devoid of inter-partner knowledge transfers, We suggest that knowledge transfers 
in these alliances should be seen from the perspective of the development of complementary 
capabilities, rather than as an attempt to acquire the partner’s knowledge (Nakamura et al., 1996; 
Lubatkin et al., 2001; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). The overwhelming emphasis on KA as the 
primary knowledge utilization strategy in alliances has somewhat excluded other knowledge 
utilization strategies, such as CS, from the focus of management research. Consequently, from an 
organizational learning standpoint, alliances in which there is no observable acquisition of 
knowledge from partners may be considered unsuccessful (e.g. Hamel et al., 1989; Inkpen, 1996; 
Inkpen and Tsang, 2007). Our findings suggest that a subset of such alliances could be 
characterized as CS alliances and that the partners’ post-alliance capability development should 
be seen in this light.  
We also make an empirical contribution by providing a unique measure for CS in 
alliances that takes both the relative distance and the technological complementarity between 
alliance partners’ capabilities into account. CS is an under-researched construct and has no 
established operationalization. In their seminal study, Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (2002) 
measured CS by the negative change in the cross-citation rate between partnering firms after 
alliance formation. Although this approach measures divergence, it relies on the strong 
assumption that such divergence occurs in a complementary rather than a random way. We take 




combining a well-founded measure for complementarity (Makri et al., 2010) with an established 
measure for technological similarity (Jaffe, 1986). Our combined measure adequately addresses 
the conceptualization of CS alliances as “alliances in which partner capabilities become more 
dissimilar, yet in a complementary way” (Nakamura et al., 1996; Mowery et al., 2002) and 
enables future empirical testing of theoretical advances in this research stream (e.g. Grant and 
Baden-Fuller, 2004; Hennart and Zeng, 2005).  
 Our results also have implications for the research streams in absorptive capacity and 
alliance experience. For the absorptive capacity research, our results show that, in line with 
Mowery et al. (2002), CS as a knowledge utilization outcome is enhanced by technological 
overlap, which is recognized as an important precedent of partner-specific absorptive capacity 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery et al., 2002). Our findings thus 
suggest that, besides the generally accepted association between absorptive capacity and KA 
(e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), absorptive capacity is also 
beneficial to the development of complementary capabilities in alliances in which do not 
culminate in inter-partner knowledge acquisition. In other words, absorptive capacity has also 
“non-absorptive” benefits to partnering firms in alliances. This underlines the 
multidimensionality of the construct (Zahra and George, 2002; Ebers and Maurer, 2014) and 
emphasizes the importance of differentiating between its knowledge evaluation and knowledge 
acquisition components. We contribute to the research on alliance experience by empirically 
showing that, besides improving alliance management capabilities (e.g. Sampson, 2005; 
Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007; Kale and Singh, 2007) and alliance performance (e.g.Zollo et al., 




acquisition of technological knowledge from alliance partners. Altogether, our study contributes 
to the understanding of alternative firm innovation strategies through alliances.  
Limitations and future research 
Our study also has limitations that could be addressed by future research. First, we rely 
on the change in alliance partners’ patent portfolios to determine the knowledge utilization 
strategies of partnering firms an alliance. While patents are widely acknowledged to represent 
firms’ technological capabilities (e.g. Mowery et al., 1996; Colombo et al., 2006; Nooteboom et 
al., 2007; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010; Vasudeva and Anand, 2011), they are ex-post measures 
of technological capability development. Thus, in an alliance context, measuring the utilization 
of technological knowledge through the change in patent portfolios requires the assumption that 
the patenting activity after the alliance formation is in line with the strategic goals of partnering 
firms in that alliance. Although there is strong support for this assumption in the literature (e.g. 
Mowery et al., 1996; Nakamura et al., 1996; Colombo, 2003; Colombo et al., 2006), future 
research can supplement patent-based analyses with ex-ante measures of alliance strategies to 
increase the robustness of such analyses.  
Second, although we provide a unique measure for CS, measuring complementarity based 
on patenting activity has inherent limitations. First, an element of arbitrariness is involved in 
aggregating patent classes into broader subcategories (Hall et al., 2001). Second, certain classes 
in a subcategory may be more complementary with one another than with other classes in that 
subcategory. Third, complementarities may exist between patent classes across subcategories. A 
more fine-grained analysis of patents and their classification could address these limitations and 




Another limitation of our empirical strategy is that, to analyze the impact of alliance 
experience on knowledge utilization, we focus on the number of previous alliances established 
by partnering firms and do not consider whether these alliances were of KA or CS type. Nor do 
we account for other possibly relevant previous alliance attributes (e.g., equity versus non-equity 
governance forms). However, experience in different types of alliances may have different 
effects on the knowledge utilization patterns in a focal alliance (Duysters et al., 2012). Future 
research could address this limitation by using more sophisticated measures of alliance 
experience. 
Somewhat surprisingly, we find no statistically significant association between 
technological overlap and KA, which is consistent with the lack of support for H3 but contradicts 
prior research in this area (Mowery et al., 1996, 1998, 2002). Our supplementary analyses 
suggest that this divergent finding results from the different empirical strategies used in this 
study and in prior work: while we measure KA by the decrease in technological distance 
between the patent portfolios of partnering firms following the alliance formation, Mowery et al. 
rely on the post-formation increase in the reciprocal patent citations of partnering firms. 
Although patent citations have been commonly used in prior research to measure knowledge 
flows across firms (e.g. Mowery et al., 1996, 1998, 2002; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003), we 
believe that technological distance provides a better operationalization for KA because the high 
correlation between pre- and post-alliance patent citations indicates a potentially spurious 
relationship between them, resulting from path-dependence in patent-citation behavior rather 
than genuine knowledge flows between alliance partners. Future research can resolve this 




 There are also other promising avenues for future research. First, researchers could 
examine whether or not there are industry-level influences on the type of knowledge utilization 
in alliances. Second, they could investigate the performance implications of experience in KA 
and CS alliances. Third, they could analyze whether KA and CS are substitutes for, or 
complementary to, one another in firms’ efforts to access external knowledge through corporate 
development activities other than alliances (e.g., mergers and acquisitions).  
Managerial implications 
Our research also points to some important managerial implications. First, our findings 
show that firms seeking CS with an alliance partner are most likely to be successful if their 
technological capabilities sufficiently overlap with those of their partners. Therefore, managers 
should screen their potential alliance partners in terms of technological overlap when making 
alliance formation decisions. While the importance of such overlap for a CS alliance may not be 
intuitively clear due to the limited knowledge transfer requirements of these alliances, our 
analyses suggest that an overlap of technological capabilities is critical to learning with alliance 
partners and achieving CS. Second, our results point to the importance of exposure to diverse 
sources of external knowledge in the development of know-how acquisition skills, as well as to 
potential outbound know-how spillovers when alliance partners have a high level of alliance 
experience. This finding suggests that managers should be wary when forming alliances with 






LEARNING TO LEARN OR LEARNING TO COORDINATE? THE 





We examine how alliance experience influences acquisition performance through 
the transfer of knowledge utilization routines. We suggest that knowledge 
acquisition alliances, which facilitate knowledge acquisition from alliance 
partners, enhance firms` knowledge integration routines whereas complementary 
specialization alliances, which facilitate knowledge access without acquisition, 
improve knowledge combination routines. Drawing on transfer theory, we argue 
that the effects of alliance experience on acquisition performance depend on the 
congruence between the knowledge utilization goals in alliances and acquisitions. 
As predicted, we find that performance of acquisitions in the semiconductor 
industry, which require knowledge integration, is affected negatively by 
experience in complementary specialization alliances, while performance of 
acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry, which require knowledge combination 
rather than integration, is affected positively by experience in complementary 
specialization alliances, and negatively by experience in knowledge acquisition 
alliances. 
 






In the last two decades mergers and acquisitions (henceforth referred to as acquisitions) 
have become increasingly important corporate development activities for accessing and utilizing 
external knowledge (Haleblian et al., 2009), as tapping into outside sources for capability 
development is as important as internal R&D efforts to remain competitive (Porrini, 2004; 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Hagedoorn and Wang, 2012). Nevertheless, most acquisitions 
fail to create shareholder value (Haleblian et al., 2009). Consequently, many researchers have 
focused their efforts to understand how firms learn to make successful acquisitions and 
investigated how prior acquisition experience influences subsequent acquisition performance (for 
a review see Barkema and Schijven, 2008). Drawing on transfer theory (Ellis, 1965; Cormier and 
Hagman, 1987; Novick, 1988), this research stream suggests that experience affects performance 
positively when the acquisitions in which the experience is gained are structurally similar to 
those it is applied, and negatively when the similarities are superficial rather than structural 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002). Extending this research 
stream, scholars have more recently pointed out similarities between acquisitions and alliances 
and have begun to investigate experience spillovers from alliances to acquisitions that affect 
acquisition performance (Porrini, 2004; Zollo and Reuer, 2010). 
 Research examining the effects of general alliance experience on acquisitions offers 
conflicting arguments and findings. While Porrini (2004) suggests that alliance experience 
teaches firms how to integrate external knowledge, Zollo and Reuer (2010) show that alliance 
experience positively affects the performance in acquisitions which require little integration. A 
likely reason for these conflicting findings is that these scholars treat alliance experience as a 




such as pooling of complementary assets or undertaking joint R&D, manufacturing, or marketing 
(Kale and Singh, 2009). While alliances provide suitable mechanisms for knowledge exchange 
and integration (Nakamura et al., 1996; Inkpen and Tsang, 2007), the degree and nature of such 
exchange and integration depends on the goals and activities in a given alliance (Mowery et al., 
1996, 2002; Inkpen and Tsang, 2007). An examination of transferability of alliance experience to 
the management of acquisitions therefore requires analyzing both the knowledge utilization 
practices employed in past alliances and those required in subsequent acquisitions. Such an 
analysis, to our knowledge, has not yet been done. 
 In terms of external knowledge utilization, research has largely focused on two distinct 
alliance types: knowledge acquisition (KA) alliances in which partner firms internalize each 
other’s technological capabilities and complementary specialization (CS) alliances in which 
partner firms combine their distinct but complementary areas of expertise (Mowery et al., 1996; 
Nakamura et al., 1996; Mowery et al., 2002; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). While KA alliances 
are geared towards knowledge transfer and organizational learning, CS alliances emphasize 
coordination and exploitation of complementarities. Consequently, experience in KA and CS 
alliances improve different sets of knowledge utilization routines, which in turn can affect the 
transferability of alliance experience to acquisitions. We examine the effects of experience in 
these two types of alliances, on acquisitions in two high technology industries, namely 
semiconductors and pharmaceuticals. These industries provide an ideal empirical setting to test 
our hypotheses as they differ in terms of the role of external technological knowledge in product 
development. We find evidence for positive as well as negative experience spillovers.  
 Our study highlights the context-dependent nature of the experience-performance 




Sahib, and Van Witteloostuijn, 2012) and offers two important theoretical contributions. First, 
we contribute to the research on experience spillovers by performing an in-depth analysis of 
structural similarities between alliances and acquisitions in terms of external knowledge 
utilization. Extant research implies that alliance experience, regardless of the nature and type of 
alliances comprising such experience, has performance implications in certain types of 
acquisitions (Porrini, 2004; Zollo and Reuer, 2010). We however show that such performance 
implications are contingent not only on the characteristics of acquisitions, but also on those of 
the alliances. Second, we contribute to the research on acquisition performance. By analyzing the 
properties of alliances and acquisitions in terms of knowledge utilization and demonstrating the 
conditions under which positive as well as negative experience spillovers materialize, we 
contribute to the efforts of researchers in this area to identify contingencies that distinguish 
successful acquisitions from unsuccessful ones (Barkema and Schijven, 2008; Haleblian et al., 
2009; Schijven and Hitt, 2012). Our findings also provide important guidelines to managers to 
shape their corporate development strategies.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Experience spillovers across alliances and acquisitions: Prior research 
Experience spillovers materialize when experience gained in one activity is transferred to 
a similar subsequent activity (Zollo and Reuer, 2010). Research on “transfer effects”, i.e. the 
transfer of experience in prior events into performance in subsequent events, is initiated by 
psychology scholars who recognized that individuals, when developing solutions to the problems 
they face, typically draw on their past experience in similar events (Cheng et al., 1986; Novick, 




performance positively as well as negatively (Cormier and Hagman, 1987), depending on the 
similarity between the prior and subsequent events (Gick and Holyoak, 1987). Specifically, prior 
experience influences subsequent performance positively when prior and subsequent events are 
similar in their structural, solution-related features, but negatively when they share similarities in 
their salient, superficial features but are structurally different (Novick, 1988).  
The subsequent application of transfer theory at the organizational level by management 
researchers shows that also at the level of organizations prior experience is generalized to 
subsequent events. In the same way that individuals develop habits and skills based on their 
experience, organizations develop routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 
2002) which are defined as `stable patterns of behavior that characterize organizational reactions 
to variegated, internal or external stimuli` (Zollo and Winter, 2002 p. 340). Acting as automated 
responses to situations organizations face, and allowing rapid transfer of experience to new 
situations (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994), routines govern many operational as well as strategic 
organizational actions (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1987). Although routines enhance 
organizational competence by allowing organizations to efficiently respond to many situations, 
they can also lead to erroneous generalization of experience causing negative performance 
implications. (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Zander and Kogut, 1995). Erroneous generalization 
occurs when a new situation is perceived as being similar to a past situation based on superficial 
features, although the two situations are structurally different (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002). 
The perceived similarity triggers the application of routines developed in the past to the new 
situation which leads to poor performance (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Zander and Kogut, 
1995). Research on new product development (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Gavetti, Levinthal, 




Haleblian, 2002; Ellis et al., 2011) show that while firms benefit from structurally similar 
experience, they typically fail to recognize the structural differences between prior and 
subsequent situations and are prone to erroneously generalize their experience.  
 The rationale behind the transfer of alliance experience to subsequent acquisition 
performance is that the two organizational activities share significant similarities in their 
strategic objectives as well as in their implementation (Zollo and Reuer, 2010). Both acquisitions 
and alliances are extensively used by firms to access and utilize external knowledge (Porrini, 
2004; Colombo et al., 2006; Haleblian et al., 2009; Hagedoorn and Wang, 2012), and are similar 
in their planning, negotiation and execution stages (Zollo and Reuer, 2010). One area in which 
the similarity between alliances and acquisitions is particularly salient is integration because both 
alliances and acquisitions require some level of integration between the resources and activities 
of two distinct organizational entities for value creation (Porrini, 2004; Zollo and Reuer, 2010). 
Because the routines related to the management of both alliances and acquisitions are mostly 
developed at the corporate level where these activities are managed (Zollo and Reuer, 2010), it is 
plausible that firms will perceive alliances and acquisitions as similar activities in terms of 
integration and apply the routines which they developed in their past alliances, to subsequent 
acquisitions.  
Although empirical evidence supports this intuition, the findings on performance 
implications of transferring integration routines from alliances to acquisitions remain 
inconclusive. Porrini (2004) for example argues that alliances improve firms’ ability to manage 
resource integration and finds a U-shaped relationship between acquirers’ alliance experience 
and abnormal stock returns in domestic U.S. acquisitions. Zollo and Reuer (2010) however find 




affects acquirers’ abnormal stock returns and accounting measures of performance positively 
when the level of integration following an acquisition is low and negatively when it is high. 
While the studies of Porrini (2004) and Zollo and Reuer (2010) provide valuable insights, 
they offer conflicting arguments as to how alliance experience affects firms’ integration 
capabilities and performance in their acquisitions. Specifically, while the former suggests that 
alliance experience enhances integration in subsequent acquisitions, the latter argues that 
alliances are unlikely to provide such benefits. We suggest that these conflicting arguments result 
from the authors’ treatment of alliance experience as a homogenous construct, i.e. the 
assumption that all alliances comprising a firm’s alliance experience are characterized by a 
similar degree of integration between alliance partners. Focusing on technological knowledge, 
which is an important resource firms seek to utilize through alliances and acquisitions (e.g. 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Colombo et al., 2006; Makri et al., 2010; Hagedoorn and Wang, 
2012), we argue that alliances, like acquisitions, differ in their degree and nature of integration, 
depending on the knowledge utilization goals of the partnering firms. Drawing on transfer 
theory, we suggest that to the extent the knowledge utilization goals in a firm’s alliances and 
acquisitions are congruent, the integration processes in the former and in the latter are 
structurally similar and the application of routines developed in alliances to acquisitions will 
enhance performance. We further argue that when these goals are incongruent, erroneous 
generalization of routines developed in alliances will undermine performance in acquisitions. We 
discuss below different knowledge utilization goals in alliances and the transfer of routines 




Knowledge utilization in alliances 
While alliances are formed to undertake a wide variety of tasks, an important motivation 
for firms to join alliances is to utilize their alliance partners’ technological knowledge, 
particularly in high-technology settings (e.g. Mowery et al., 1996; Hoang and Rothaermel, 
2010). Research on alliances distinguishes two strategies that firms can pursue to realize this 
goal: knowledge acquisition and knowledge access without acquisition (Mowery et al., 1996; 
Nakamura et al., 1996; Mowery et al., 2002; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). Firms pursuing a 
knowledge acquisition strategy seek to internalize their alliance partners’ knowledge through 
organizational learning (e.g. Inkpen, 1998; Inkpen and Tsang, 2007). Such alliances are defined 
as KA alliances (Mowery et al., 1996, 2002). In contrast, alliances characterized by knowledge 
access without acquisition are formed by firms which seek CS rather than knowledge transfer. In 
CS alliances partnering firms focus their capability development efforts to specialize each in 
their distinct but complementary areas of expertise, rather than to replicate each other’s 
capabilities (Mowery et al., 1996; Nakamura et al., 1996; Mowery et al., 2002; Grant and 
Baden-Fuller, 2004; Lui, 2009). KA and CS alliances require different knowledge utilization 
mechanisms due to their distinct knowledge utilization goals (Mowery et al., 1996; Nakamura et 
al., 1996; Mowery et al., 2002). 
Knowledge acquisition alliances and acquisition performance 
As the knowledge utilization goal in KA alliances is to internalize the alliance partners’ 
knowledge, these alliances are characterized by a high degree of knowledge integration. In fact, 
the success of KA alliances are determined by the extent to which alliance partners integrate 




alliances provide partner firms with access to each other’s capabilities and know-how (Kale et 
al., 2002), alliance participation is not enough to realize interpartner learning. Important 
preconditions for such learning are the intent and effort to learn (Inkpen and Tsang, 2007). In 
their study on alliances between Asian and Western partners Hamel, Doz and Prahalad (1989 p. 
134) note that “in every case in which a Japanese company emerged from an alliance stronger 
than its Western partner, the Japanese company had made a greater effort to learn”. To 
successfully learn from their alliance partners and acquire their knowledge, it is essential that 
firms act upon their learning intent by incorporating knowledge transfer mechanisms into the 
design of their alliances (Mowery et al., 2002), and devise internal processes to facilitate the 
internal application of the transferred knowledge (Inkpen and Dinur, 1998). 
An illustrative case for knowledge acquisition through learning from alliance partners is 
the NUMMI alliance between General Motors (GM) and Toyota formed in 1983 to jointly 
operate a production facility in the US (Inkpen, 2008). GM’s intention to learn Toyota’s 
manufacturing techniques was explicitly reflected in the alliance agreement which included 
provisions for knowledge transfer such as site visits of GM personnel (Mowery et al., 2002). 
These site visits provided valuable exposure for GM to Toyota’s production capabilities because 
a significant portion of knowledge underlying firm capabilities is tacit (Dyer and Singh, 1998) 
and can only be transferred by interactions of alliance partners’ personnel at the operating level 
(Inkpen and Dinur, 1998; Janowicz-Panjaitan and Noorderhaven, 2009). While such interactions 
allowed GM personnel to individually learn about Toyota’s production techniques, GM adopted 
further measures to manage these individual learning experiences. Such measures included 
setting up a Technical Liaison Office to coordinate the site visits, setting explicit learning goals 




codify learning experiences (Inkpen, 2008). Through these systematical learning efforts, GM was 
able to facilitate the diffusion and application of Toyota production techniques in its other plants 
and to achieve significant reductions in production costs (Inkpen, 2008).  
As the GM case illustrates, knowledge transfer and integration from alliance partners 
requires firms to set up such mechanisms that allow observation of how an alliance partner 
applies its knowledge at the operating level, codification of lessons drawn from these 
observations, and diffusion of these lessons within the firm. As firms accumulate experience in 
KA alliances, these knowledge utilization mechanisms are stored in knowledge utilization 
routines (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994) which collectively lead to a knowledge acquisition 
capability (Zollo and Winter, 2002). The routinized application of this capability does not only 
allow a firm to efficiently integrate its alliance partners’ knowledge in subsequent KA alliances, 
it can also enhance knowledge integration in its subsequent acquisitions, depending on the 
knowledge integration requirements in such acquisitions.  
An important factor determining the knowledge integration requirements in an 
acquisition is the interdependence between the acquirer and target firms in terms of technological 
knowledge (Puranam and Srikanth, 2007; Puranam, Singh, and Chaudhuri, 2009). Such 
interdependence is high in industries in which commercial products are typically developed 
based on multiple technological components whose ownership rights are distributed across 
multiple firms in the industry. This is for instance the case in the semiconductor industry (Levin 
et al., 1987; Merges and Nelson, 1990; Ziedonis, 2004). The relationship between commercial 
products and components of technological knowledge in such industries is referred to as 
“complex” because of the multiple links between the former and the latter (Levin et al., 1987; 




complex technologies to reduce their dependence on their rivals’ technologies. Indeed, 
semiconductor firms widely use acquisitions for technological knowledge sourcing (Phene, 
Tallman, and Almeida, 2010; Wagner, 2011). In these acquisitions the integration of the target 
firm`s technological knowledge into the acquirer firm`s operations following an acquisition is 
desirable because this knowledge is likely to be utilized in the development of new products by 
the acquirer firm (Puranam and Srikanth, 2007). This process is structurally similar to the 
knowledge acquisition process in KA alliances as both processes share the same objective, which 
is integrating external knowledge into the internal knowledge base. Thus, the knowledge 
acquisition capability developed in KA alliances may enhance knowledge integration and 
performance in acquisitions in semiconductor industry.  
Hypothesis 1a: KA alliance experience is positively associated with acquisition 
performance in the semiconductor industry. 
In contrast to industries with complex technologies, the technological knowledge 
interdependence between firms is low in industries with `discrete technologies`, which are 
defined as technological settings in which commercial products are developed based on 
relatively few “purpose-built” technological innovations which are either weakly related or 
unrelated to other products (Levin et al., 1987; Merges and Nelson, 1990). In the pharmaceutical 
industry for example, most acquisitions are made by larger pharmaceutical firms to internalize 
the product development projects or unique capabilities, such as generation of innovative ideas, 
of smaller biotechnology firms (Pisano, 2006). In these acquisitions a large-scale integration of 
the target firm’s technological knowledge into the acquiring firm’s operations is unlikely to be 




specific product and is unlikely to be utilized in other product development projects (Reitzig, 
2004).  
Since the target firm’s operations are likely to be continued as a separate business unit 
(Puranam and Srikanth, 2007), the knowledge utilization goal in these acquisitions is the 
exploitation of complementarities between the acquirer and target firms’ distinct knowledge 
bases, rather than their integration. This process is structurally different than the knowledge 
acquisition process in KA alliances. Thus, the application of knowledge acquisition routines 
developed in KA alliances may impede acquisition performance for at least two reasons. First, 
the application of these routines may lead the acquiring firm to direct its managerial attention to 
knowledge integration and prevent the recognition of distinct competences of the acquirer and 
target firms’ knowledge bases. Second, the emphasis on knowledge integration in acquisition 
management may interfere with the target firm’s organizational processes and may disrupt the 
further development of the target firm’s technology. 
Hypothesis 1b: KA alliance experience is negatively associated with acquisition 
performance in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Complementary specialization alliances and acquisition performance 
In contrast to KA alliances which facilitate knowledge transfer between alliance partners, 
CS alliances allow partnering firms to pool their complementary capabilities, and jointly apply 
them to commercial outcomes (Mowery et al., 2002; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). CS 
alliances provide significant efficiency gains as they allow partnering firms to simultaneously 
specialize in their own areas of expertise and utilize each other’s complementary capabilities 




producer of Swatch watches) who jointly designed and produced the “Smart” car. Its “out-of-the-
box” design and lightweight body are the result of the design capabilities of SMH (Hård and 
Knie, 2001), while its adequate mechanical features despite the size limitations are the result of 
Daimler’s expertise in automotive engineering. Despite their success in developing the Smart 
car, neither of the two firms has actively tried to internalize each other’s capabilities for 
competitive reasons (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004).  
Differences in knowledge utilization in KA and CS alliances are reflected in their design 
and execution. While formal provisions for knowledge exchange between alliance partners are 
essential in the design of KA alliances, they are absent in CS alliances (Mowery et al., 2002). 
Within the framework of these knowledge exchange provisions, the partnering firms in KA 
alliances have a considerable control over the knowledge utilization process, as they can create 
and implement mechanisms to facilitate the transfer and internal application of their alliance 
partners’ knowledge, as illustrated by GM-Toyota alliance. In CS alliances, however, the 
knowledge utilization process requires that each alliance partner individually applies its 
knowledge toward a joint outcome. In the absence of formal knowledge exchange provisions, 
firms rely on informal coordination mechanisms such as trust to ensure the contribution of their 
alliance partners to the desired alliance outcome (Lui, 2009). Such trust is the result of the 
confidence that an alliance partner does not only has the technological knowledge to carry out its 
part of the division of labor in the alliance, but it also will apply this knowledge in the way 
specified at the outset of the alliance. Building this confidence requires that alliance partners 
recognize each other’s respective complementary competences, and develop a framework to 




ability to recognize and combine complementarities between distinct technological knowledge 
bases is stored in organizational routines, leading to a knowledge combination capability.  
While the routinized application of this capability allows firms to effectively execute 
subsequent CS alliances, it can also be beneficial in acquisitions. Since most acquisitions in 
pharmaceutical industry are likely to be motivated by the potential exploitation of the 
complementarities between the acquirer and target firms, as we argued above, managing these 
acquisitions is structurally similar to the knowledge combination process in CS alliances. The 
application of the knowledge combination capability developed in CS alliances can thus enhance 
performance in these acquisitions, by allowing the acquirer firms to leverage the 
complementarities between their knowledge bases and those of the target firms while keeping 
them distinct. 
Hypothesis 2a: CS alliance experience is positively associated with acquisition 
performance in the pharmaceutical industry. 
 While CS alliances improve knowledge combination capabilities, they teach firms little 
about knowledge integration. The lack of knowledge exchange opportunities with alliance 
partners, which may be explicitly restricted in the alliance agreements (Mowery et al., 2002), and 
the emphasis on knowledge access and combination rather than acquisition and integration, 
prevents firms from developing knowledge integration routines by participating in CS alliances. 
The application of knowledge combination routines developed in CS alliances can impede 
performance in acquisitions motivated by resource integration, such as acquisitions in 
semiconductor industry, as they neglect the intensive interaction processes for knowledge 




Hypothesis 2b: CS alliance experience is negatively associated with acquisition 
performance in the semiconductor industry. 
Moderating effects of internal R&D  
Thus far we have argued that alliance experience positively affects acquisition 
performance when knowledge utilization processes across alliances and acquisitions are 
structurally similar, and negatively when they are structurally different. Firms however do not 
depend only on alliances to develop knowledge utilization capabilities, but also on internal R&D 
(Hagedoorn and Wang, 2012).  
Investment in R&D provides a firm with product-specific knowledge (the knowledge 
underlying the products based on that R&D), as well as with “generic” knowledge, which can be 
described as “…a body of generic understanding about how things work, key variables affecting 
performance, the nature of major opportunities and currently binding constraints, and promising 
approaches to pushing these back.” (Nelson, 1990 p.196). Because generic knowledge 
“encompasses broad principles or understandings”, it deepens a firm’s general understanding of 
technology, and the applications of technology in a wider range of areas than a firm’s existing 
products (Argyres and Silverman, 2004 p.935). Generic knowledge is therefore relatively 
generalizable, and can endow a firm with the ability to benefit from new and relatively 
unfamiliar external knowledge. In an acquisition context, generic R&D knowledge can thus 
enable an acquirer firm to deal with complexities related to linking the target firm’s 
technological knowledge base to its own (Desyllas and Hughes, 2010).  
One such complexity pertains to the fit between the acquirer firm’s existing knowledge 




as a firm’s R&D intensity increases, its generic R&D knowledge base expands, allowing the firm 
to evaluate with greater accuracy how to link a target firm’s knowledge base to its own. 
Although greater R&D intensity may not necessarily lead to a greater generic knowledge base, 
the widely established association between R&D intensity and a firm’s ability to benefit from 
new and novel external knowledge suggest a strong relationship between them (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Furthermore, R&D intensity is shown to positively affect the early adoption of 
new organizational routines (Massini et al., 2002), suggesting that greater R&D intensity 
decreases the rigidity of firms’ routines, thus making them less likely to be semi-automatically 
transferred to new situations. We therefore expect firms with greater degrees of R&D intensity to 
have a more accurate judgment on the applicability of knowledge utilization routines developed 
in alliances to subsequent acquisitions which can prevent firms from erroneously generalizing 
them. 
Hypothesis 3a: The negative relationship between KA alliance experience and 
acquisition performance in the pharmaceutical industry is mitigated by the intensity 
of internal R&D. 
Hypothesis 3b: The negative relationship between CS alliance experience and 
acquisition performance in the semiconductor industry is mitigated by the intensity 





Sample and data sources 
We test our hypotheses on a sample of 316 acquisitions in two high technology 
industries, namely semiconductors and pharmaceuticals
10
. Several reasons motivated our focus 
on these two industries. First, semiconductors and pharmaceuticals are typical examples for 
complex and discrete technologies, respectively (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000), hence 
provide a suitable empirical context to test our hypotheses. Second, technology plays a vital role 
for both industries as firms in both industries actively patent (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). Third, 
external technological knowledge utilization through alliances and acquisitions is common in 
both industries: According to the SDC Acquisition and Alliance databases, 11 percent of all 
acquisitions between 1996 and 2002 are made by semiconductor or pharmaceutical firms, while 
24 percent of alliances formed by patent-holding firms between 1991 and 2001 involve firms 
from these industries. 
 To construct our sample we identify completed acquisitions leading to 100 percent 
ownership in the SDC Acquisitions Database with announcement dates between 1996 and 2002 
(inclusive) by semiconductor and pharmaceutical firms which have at least one alliance in the 
SDC Alliance Database with a patent-holding partner at the ultimate parent level
11
 in five years 
preceding a focal acquisition. This initial search resulted in 352 acquisitions. We then obtain 
patent data from NBER patent data project (Hall et al., 2001) for the acquiring firms in our 
sample and for their alliance partners, to determine the knowledge utilization strategies 
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 Semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries are represented by SIC codes 3674 and 2834 respectively. 
11
 We exclude alliance among subsidiaries to eliminate concerns associated with diffusion of technological 




materialized in the acquiring firms’ alliances and to construct our independent variables. Finally 
we obtain stock price data for acquiring firms from the CRSP Database to construct our 
dependent variable, and financial data from Compustat Database to construct our control 
variables. We exclude 30 acquisitions due to missing stock price and financial data, and six 
acquisitions due to their outlier status with respect to the dependent variable
12
. Our final sample 
includes 316 acquisitions of which 219 are realized by 52 semiconductor firms and 97 are 
realized by 29 pharmaceutical firms. 
Dependent variable 
 We use the standard event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985) to measure our 
dependent variable acquisition performance with cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) associated 
with an acquisition announcement. CARs represent unanticipated returns to a stock resulting 
from a certain event, in this case an acquisition. Event study methodology is commonly used in 
both management and finance research (Haleblian et al., 2009), and several studies show that 
CARs correlate with other measures of post-acquisition performance (e.g. Healy, Palepu, and 
Ruback, 1992; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992). To calculate CARs we first estimate the following 
asset pricing model using historical data from a 240-day period preceding an acquisition 
announcement (Anand and Khanna, 2000): 
rit = αi + βrmt + εit 
Here rit denotes returns for firm i on day t, rmt denotes corresponding daily returns on CRSP value 
weighted index and εit is distributed i.i.d. We then use the estimates from the asset pricing model 
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 Among 322 acquisitions with complete data, three acquisitions in semiconductor and three in pharmaceutical 
industries have dependent variables which are more than three standard deviations away from the mean. We exclude 




to calculate predicted returns over a five day period around the acquisition announcement date (-
2, 2) i.e. the “event window”. Using a short event window mitigates the risk of including 
confounding events within the event window (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Next, we calculate 
abnormal returns within the event window by subtracting the predicted returns from the actual 
returns. Finally we calculate CARs as the summation of abnormal returns within the event 
window.  
Independent variables 
Our independent variables are acquiring firms’ experience in KA and CS alliances. To 
construct these variables we first identify all alliances of acquiring firms in our sample with 
patent-holding partners in five years preceding a focal acquisition year. Using a five year 
window to measure the effects of an alliance is consistent with prior research in this area (Kale et 
al., 2002; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). We then analyze the development of acquiring firms’ 
technological profiles with respect to technological profiles of their alliance partners by 
measuring the technological distance between them one year before and five years after the 
alliance formation year. Consistent with prior research (e.g. Vasudeva and Anand, 2011), we 
measure technological distance between alliance partners using the technological similarity 
measure developed by Jaffe (1986) based on uncentered correlation between patent portfolios of 
alliance partners and calculated with the following formula: 
Pij = FiF`j / [(FiFj) (Fji)]
 1/2 
where Pij is the technological similarity between two patent portfolios, Fi is the vector of 
technological capabilities for firm i, and Fj is the vector of technological capabilities for firm j. 




patent class k. This similarity measure ranges from 0 to 1 such that 0 represents complete 
dissimilarity and 1 represents perfect similarity between alliance partners’ technological profiles. 
To calculate the technological distance, we subtract the similarity values from 1. Decreasing 
technological distance after the alliance formation signifies convergence between partners’ 
technological capabilities and is an indicator of knowledge spillovers (Jaffe, 1986) and learning 
(Mowery et al., 1996; Nakamura et al., 1996; Mowery et al., 2002). Consequently, alliances in 
which the technological distance between partners’ patent portfolios decreased after the alliance 
formation are classified as KA alliances. 
While increasing technological distance between alliance partners can indicate CS 
(Mowery et al., 2002), we perform an additional analysis to evaluate whether the increase in 
technological distance unfolds in a complementary rather than random way. Following Makri, 
Hitt and Lane (2010) we measure complementarity between alliance partners` technological 
profiles by their patents in the same patent subcategories but in different patent classes. The US 
Patent Office classifies patents in 417 3-digit classes and Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) 
further aggregate these 417 classes into 37 subcategories and 6 main categories in the NBER 
Patent Data Project (Hall et al., 2001). Each class belongs to only one subcategory. We measure 
the degree of complementarity by the ratio of alliance partners’ successful patent applications in 
the same patent subcategory but in different patent classes, to their all successful patent 
applications. For each alliance we compute the degree of complementarity before and five years 
after the alliance formation year. We then identify alliances in which both technological distance 
and complementarity between partner firms increase after the alliance formation as CS alliances. 





After classifying the alliances of acquiring firms into KA and CS categories, we compute 
the variables Acquirer KA alliance experience and Acquirer CS alliance experience for each 
acquiring firm as the ratios of each firm’s KA and CS alliances to its all alliances, respectively. 
Calculating KA and CS alliance experience as a ratio of alliance experience rather than as 
absolute count values helps us focus on the importance of a particular external knowledge 
utilization strategy in an acquiring firm’s technology sourcing efforts, and facilitates 
comparisons between firms with numerous alliances and those with relatively few.  
Control variables 
 We include several control variables to exclude alternative explanations for our results. 
First, we control for acquiring firms’ total alliance experience in five years preceding the 
acquisition announcement year to account for any influence on acquisition performance arising 
from general alliance experience (Porrini, 2004; Zollo and Reuer, 2010). We also control for 
acquiring firms’ acquisition experience in five years preceding the acquisition announcement 
year and for the natural logarithm of acquiring firms’ total assets as of one year before the 
acquisition year, since both acquisition experience and firm size are well recognized for their 
influence on acquisition performance (Haleblian et al., 2009). Further, we control for the 
acquiring firms’ average R&D intensity and average return on assets (ROA) in five years 
preceding the acquisition year as these variables affect acquirers’ ability to convert the acquired 
knowledge into innovative performance (Makri et al., 2010) ,which in turn can affect the stock 
market response to an acquisition. We further control for industry relatedness between acquirer 
and targets firms with a dummy variable which is coded as 1 when acquirer and target firms are 
in the same 4-digit SIC code. We also include year dummies to control for unobserved 




control for the market value of the acquirer firms to account for the possible influence of 
acquiring firms’ market capitalization on the market’s response to the acquisition.  
 We further control in our analysis for the relative weights of exploration and exploitation 
in acquirer firms’ knowledge stock as of one year before the acquisition year, to account for the 
possible influence of acquiring firms’ tendencies towards exploratory and exploitative capability 
development (March, 1991). Following Nooteboom et al (2007), we classify acquirer firm 
patents as exploratory if a focal patent is in a patent class in which the acquiring firm has not 
successfully applied for a patent in five years preceding the application year of the focal patent, 
and as exploitative if a focal patent is in a patent class in which the acquiring firm has 
successfully applied for a patent in five years preceding the application year of the focal patent. 
We then calculate Acquirer R&D exploration ratio for each acquirer firm by dividing the number 
of exploratory patents by the total number of successfully applied patents as of each acquisition 
year. 
Empirical analysis 
 To account for unobserved heterogeneity among acquiring firms we use a fixed effects 
estimation with robust standard errors, and cluster standard errors on unique acquirers in our 
sample to avoid overestimating the significance levels of coefficients (Schijven and Hitt, 2012). 
We estimate our models separately on semiconductor and pharmaceutical samples which 







Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations of the variables for semiconductor and 
pharmaceutical samples are reported in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. The mean CAR over the 
five-day window is -0.242 percent in the semiconductor sample and -0.377 percent in the 
pharmaceutical sample. The proportion of positive returns is 49 percent in the semiconductor 
sample and 42 percent in the pharmaceutical sample.  In the semiconductor sample correlations 
between Acquirer alliance experience, Acquirer acquisition experience, Acquirer total assets, 
Acquirer average ROA and Stock market value are high, suggesting that large semiconductor 
firms tend to have a higher ROA, and engage in acquisitions and alliances more than smaller 
firms. In the pharmaceutical sample correlations between Acquirer total assets, Acquirer alliance 
experience, Acquirer acquisition experience, Acquirer average ROA, Acquirer average R&D 
intensity and Stock market value are high suggesting that larger pharmaceutical firms tend to 
engage in more acquisitions and alliances, and that returns to assets are invested into R&D. 
While these high correlations are not surprising given the characteristics of these industries, they 
may present a collinearity problem in regression models. To check whether our empirical models 
are affected by multicollinearity among predictor variables, we examine the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) of our variables separately for both samples. In the semiconductor sample the 
variable with the highest VIF is Acquirer alliance experience (5.22) with a sample mean VIF 
2.78, and in the pharmaceutical sample it is Acquirer total assets (8.42) with a sample mean VIF 
3.20. Since these values are below the commonly accepted threshold value of 10 (Studenmund, 





Table 1 – Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the semiconductor sample 
 Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) CAR(-2, 2)     -0.002     0.086    -0.234     0.274 1.00           
(2) Acquirer KA alliance experience     0.661     0.295     0.000     1.000 0.11 1.00          
(3) Acquirer CS alliance experience     0.114     0.211     0.000     1.000 -0.03 -0.51 1.00         
(4) Acquirer alliance experience     12.379    16.561     1.000    49.000 0.02 0.14 -0.10 1.00        
(5) Acquirer acquisition experience      5.703     6.746     0.000    34.000 -0.01 0.18 -0.19 0.59 1.00       
(6) LN Acquirer total assets      7.576     2.046     2.229    10.778 -0.01 0.11 -0.13 0.75 0.66 1.00      
(7) Acquirer average R&D intensity      0.147     0.081     0.017     0.742 -0.07 -0.25 -0.08 -0.33 0.03 -0.15 1.00     
(8) Acquirer average ROA      0.179     0.116    -0.208     0.390 0.07 0.17 -0.01 0.70 0.40 0.75 -0.46 1.00    
(9) Stock market value     52.318   104.716     0.004   462.520 0.03 0.16 -0.10 0.85 0.59 0.64 -0.25 0.65 1.00   
(10) Acquirer R&D exploration ratio      0.190     0.264     0.000     1.000 0.02 -0.13 0.01 -0.41 -0.36 -0.55 0.19 -0.43 -0.30 1.00  
(11) Industry relatedness     0.397     0.490     0.000     1.000 0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 0.07 -0.10 -0.13 0.13 1.0 
All correlations above 0.14 are significant 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the pharmaceutical sample 
 Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) CAR(-2, 2)    -0.004     0.054    -0.173     0.151 1.00           
(2) Acquirer KA alliance experience     0.477     0.337     0.000     1.000 0.07 1.00          
(3) Acquirer CS alliance experience     0.166     0.250     0.000     1.000 0.02 -0.31 1.00         
(4) Acquirer alliance experience     6.979     6.479     1.000    21.000 -0.02 0.28 -0.15 1.00        
(5) Acquirer acquisition experience     4.887     4.661     0.000    16.000 -0.06 -0.19 -0.00 0.17 1.00       
(6) LN Acquirer total assets     7.526     2.821     1.430    10.692 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 0.62 0.69 1.00      
(7) Acquirer average R&D intensity     0.559     1.026     0.019     6.157 0.12 0.22 -0.04 -0.37 -0.42 -0.60 1.00     
(8) Acquirer average ROA     0.088     0.260    -1.089     0.354 -0.01 -0.16 0.01 0.57 0.58 0.82 -0.77 1.00    
(9) Stock market value    52.622    56.897     0.027   198.923 -0.06 -0.00 0.03 0.41 0.73 0.81 -0.41 0.60 1.00   
(10) Acquirer R&D exploration ratio     0.218     0.314     0.000     1.000 0.13 -0.17 0.01 -0.48 -0.24 -0.53 0.11 -0.26 -0.51 1.00  
(11) Industry relatedness     0.443     0.499     0.000     1.000 -0.06 0.07 0.15 -0.03 -0.19 -0.16 0.16 -0.17 -0.15 0.06 1.00 




Descriptive statistics reveal differences as well as similarities between the semiconductor 
and pharmaceutical industries. The mean value for Acquirer KA alliance experience is higher in 
the semiconductor sample but the mean value for Acquirer CS alliance experience is higher in 
the pharmaceutical sample, supporting our contention that KA alliances are more likely to be 
formed in industries with complex technologies and CS alliances are more likely to be formed in 
industries with discrete technologies. While before a focal acquisition average acquirers in both 
industries have similar amounts of acquisition experience, an average acquirer in the 
semiconductor sample has experienced almost twice the number of alliances with patent-holding 
partners than an average acquirer in the pharmaceutical sample, which highlights the strong 
technological interdependence in the semiconductor industry. In contrast, average R&D intensity 
is almost four times higher in the pharmaceutical sample confirming the importance of discrete 
and ‘purpose-built’ nature of technological knowledge in this industry.  
The remarkably higher mean value and lower standard deviation of Average ROA for 
acquirers in the semiconductor sample compared to acquirers in the pharmaceutical sample 
suggests that while financial profitability in the latter industry is on average relatively low, it is 
subject to more variation. This observation is consistent with the widely-acknowledged 
characterization of the pharmaceutical industry as having higher levels of uncertainty than other 
high technology industries (Pisano, 2006). Acquirers in both samples exhibit similar levels of 
exploration (as opposed to exploitation) orientation in their R&D efforts, although the variation 
among firms in the pharmaceutical sample is relatively higher. While in both samples less than 
half of the acquisitions occurred between firms sharing the same primary 4-digit SIC code, 
pharmaceutical acquirers exhibit a slightly stronger preference for targets in their own SIC code 





Table 3 presents the regression results on the semiconductor sample used to test 
Hypotheses 1a, 2b and 3b. Models 1 and 2 include control variables, Model 3 adds alliance 
experience to controls, Model 4 is the full model with the main effects and Model 5 adds the 
interaction effect between Acquirer CS alliance experience and Acquirer average R&D intensity 
to test Hypothesis 3b. Among control variables Acquirer R&D exploration ratio is significant 
across all models suggesting that higher degrees of exploratory R&D leads to a better 
performance in acquisitions of semiconductor firms. Acquirer alliance experience is not 
significant in Models 3 through 5 which is consistent with prior research on experience spillovers 
(Zollo and Reuer, 2010). 
Hypothesis 1a predicts that KA alliance experience is positively associated with 
acquisition performance and Hypothesis 2b predicts that CS alliance experience is negatively 
associated with acquisition performance in the semiconductor industry. The coefficient for 
Acquirer KA alliance experience is positive but insignificant in Model 4 providing no support to 
H1a. The coefficient for Acquirer CS alliance experience is negative and significant supporting 
H2b. This finding suggests that all else being equal, one standard deviation increase in CS 
alliance experience decreases acquirer CARs associated with an acquisition by 3.27 percent in 
the semiconductor industry. In another interpretation, an acquirer firm which followed a strategy 
toward CS in all of its alliances can be expected to have 15.5 percent lower CARs following a 
subsequent acquisition than an acquirer firm with no CS alliance experience, all else being equal. 
Hypothesis 3b predicts that the negative effects of CS alliance experience on acquisition 
performance are mitigated by R&D intensity. We test H3b with Model 5. The coefficient of the 




Acquirer CS alliance experience and Acquirer average R&D intensity are at their means, the 
predicted CAR is 0.77 percent whereas when Acquirer CS alliance experience is held at its mean 
and Acquirer average R&D intensity increases by 1 percent the predicted CAR is 1.44 percent. 
The graph in Figure 1 illustrates the change in CARs in the semiconductor sample at different 
levels of Acquirer CS alliance experience and Acquirer average R&D intensity. 
Table 3 – OLS fixed-effects regression models on semiconductor sample 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Car(-2,2) Car(-2,2) Car(-2,2) Car(-2,2) Car(-2,2) 
Acquirer KA alliance experience    0.00280 -0.00474 
   (0.06083) (0.06382) 
Acquirer CS alliance experience    -0.15508** -1.03850*** 
   (0.07618) (0.30451) 
Acquirer CS alliance experience X R&D 
intensity 
    7.34906*** 
    (2.58375) 
Acquirer alliance experience   0.00140 0.00040 -0.00003 
  (0.00150) (0.00132) (0.00141) 
Acquirer acquisition experience -0.00149 -0.00036 -0.00001 -0.00080 -0.00147 
(0.00164) (0.00252) (0.00248) (0.00244) (0.00245) 
LN Acquirer total assets 0.04656 0.09285* 0.09519* 0.08950* 0.09131** 
(0.03469) (0.04948) (0.04859) (0.04855) (0.04473) 
Acquirer average R&D intensity 0.23823 0.53693 0.68712 0.55633 -0.17170 
(0.35280) (0.71038) (0.73042) (0.72185) (0.76326) 
Acquirer average ROA 0.39578 0.24567 0.28234 0.10276 -0.26521 
(0.41094) (0.33733) (0.33787) (0.26435) (0.29137) 
Stock market value 0.00003 0.00007 0.00005 0.00009 0.00009 
(0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00010) 
Acquirer R&D exploration ratio 0.56485*** 0.57567*** 0.58210*** 0.55262*** 0.52931*** 
(0.12623) (0.11900) (0.11873) (0.12219) (0.14564) 
Industry relatedness -0.00900 -0.00796 -0.00759 -0.00678 -0.00728 
(0.01040) (0.01094) (0.01108) (0.01124) (0.01162) 
Constant -0.55759** -0.87895** -0.94781** -0.80969** -0.64180* 
(0.27542) (0.39822) (0.39454) (0.37713) (0.37058) 
Year dummies Excluded Included Included Included Included 
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 
R-squared 0.07947 0.13046 0.13252 0.14461 0.16979 
Prob > F 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 




Figure 1 – Interaction between CS alliance experience and R&D intensity on 
semiconductor sample with 95% confidence intervals 
 
 Table 4 presents the regression results on the pharmaceutical sample used to test 
Hypotheses 1b, 2a and 3a. As in Table 3, Models 6 and 7 are control models, Model 8 is the 
control model which includes alliance experience, Model 9 is the full model with the main 
effects and Model 10 adds the interaction effect between Acquirer KA alliance experience and 
Acquirer average R&D intensity to test Hypothesis 3a. Similar to the results in the 
semiconductor sample, in models 8 and 9 the coefficient of alliance experience does not have 
any statistically significant influence on acquisition performance although it gains marginal 





Table 4 – OLS fixed-effects regression models on pharmaceutical sample 
 
Model (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent variable Car(-2,2) Car(-2,2) Car(-2,2) Car(-2,2) Car(-2,2) 
Acquirer KA alliance experience    -0.14687* -0.16023 
   (0.08035) (0.09941) 
Acquirer CS alliance experience    0.07614*** 0.08171** 
   (0.02138) (0.03101) 
Acquirer KA alliance experience X R&D 
intensity 
    0.02364 
    (0.09680) 
Acquirer alliance experience   0.00054 0.00474 0.00495* 
  (0.00274) (0.00285) (0.00280) 
Acquirer acquisition experience 0.00251** 0.00237 0.00222 0.00282 0.00287 
(0.00101) (0.00230) (0.00254) (0.00194) (0.00193) 
LN Acquirer total assets -0.00400 1.42e-06 0.00011 0.00580 0.00545 
(0.01524) (0.02416) (0.02450) (0.01979) (0.02009) 
Acquirer average R&D intensity -0.00059 -0.00538 -0.00482 -0.00274 -0.02477 
(0.01451) (0.01519) (0.01644) (0.01446) (0.09883) 
Acquirer average ROA 0.09019* 0.11044** 0.11026** 0.06345 0.06652 
(0.05130) (0.05200) (0.05307) (0.04752) (0.04516) 
Stock market value -0.00018 -0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00001 2.45e-07 
(0.00013) (0.00026) (0.00030) (0.00028) (0.00027) 
Acquirer R&D exploration ratio 0.07415 0.10139 0.10149 0.08105 0.08645 
(0.07426) (0.07677) (0.07744) (0.08669) (0.08591) 
Industry relatedness -0.01534 -0.01240 -0.01254 -0.00219 -0.00247 
(0.00906) (0.00852) (0.00856) (0.00825) (0.00803) 
Constant 0.00637 -0.02459 -0.02912 -0.04258 -0.03375 
(0.11340) (0.17998) (0.18775) (0.15324) (0.16584) 
Year dummies Excluded Included Included Included Included 
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 
R-squared 0.07950 0.13084 0.13127 0.24499 0.24566 
Prob > F 0.00080 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 






Hypothesis 1b predicts that KA alliance experience is negatively associated with 
acquisition performance and Hypothesis 2a predicts that CS alliance experience is positively 
associated with acquisition performance in the pharmaceutical industry. In model 9 the 
coefficient for Acquirer KA alliance experience is negative and significant supporting H1b. This 
finding suggests that all else being equal, one standard deviation increase in KA alliance 
experience decreases acquirer CARs associated with an acquisition by 4.95 percent. In another 
interpretation, an acquirer firm which followed a strategy toward KA from its alliance partners in 
all of its alliances can be expected to have 14.7 percent lower CARs following a subsequent 
acquisition than an acquirer firm with no KA alliance experience, all else being equal. The 
coefficient for Acquirer CS alliance experience is positive and significant, supporting H2a. This 
finding implies that all else being equal, one standard deviation increase in CS alliance 
experience increases acquirer CARs associated with an acquisition by 1.9 percent in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Hypothesis 3a predicts that the negative effects of KA alliance 
experience on acquisition performance are mitigated by R&D intensity. We test H3a with Model 
10. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and insignificant providing no support to 
H3a. We elaborate on our findings in the following section. 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper we investigate the transferability of alliance experience to acquisitions from 
a technological knowledge utilization point of view and find evidence for positive as well as 
negative transfer. A key contribution of this study is that we develop a theoretical framework 
based on transfer theory (Ellis, 1965; Cormier and Hagman, 1987) for the transfer of benefits 
from different types of alliance experience to subsequent acquisitions in high technology 




acquisition performance, and allows for a more fine-grained analysis of the effects of alliance 
experience. Before discussing the theoretical and managerial implications of our findings we 
want to elaborate on them in more detail. 
While we find empirical support for our hypothesized negative transfer effects in both 
semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries, in the semiconductor industry this is not the case 
for positive transfer effects. Considering the nature of our dependent variable, this implies that 
potential benefits of alliance experience in acquisitions by semiconductor firms are not reflected 
in acquisition performance at the point of acquisition announcement, even though such 
experience is congruent with the knowledge utilization requirements in this industry. One 
possible explanation for this is that acquisitions in industries with complex technologies require a 
greater degree of integration between acquirer and target firms than alliances (Haleblian et al., 
2009; Zollo and Reuer, 2010), and the integration of technological knowledge is part of a larger 
post-acquisition integration process. It is therefore possible that the effects of experience in 
knowledge integration through alliances are diluted within the overall evaluation of an 
acquisition and by itself not sufficient enough to generate a positive performance impact. 
How can we explain the significant negative effects then? We provide two possible 
explanations. First, negative transfer resulting from erroneous generalization of past experience 
materializes easier than positive transfer (Novick, 1988), which requires managerial effort to 
analyze the similarities between the past and subsequent events and to only apply the past 
experience when appropriate (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). It is therefore possible that 
alliance experience that is dissimilar to a focal acquisition in terms of knowledge utilization 




Second, in addition to misapplication of prior knowledge utilization experience, acquiring 
firms which participate in alliances with knowledge utilization goals incongruent with those 
required by their subsequent acquisitions may also be neglecting the development of such 
knowledge utilization routines that are necessary to successfully undertake acquisitions. In the 
semiconductor industry for example a firm with many CS alliances may be underemphasizing 
internal knowledge creation. The compensating effect of internal R&D in the semiconductor 
sample supports this reasoning. In pharmaceuticals, the level of post-acquisition integration is 
relatively low and acquisition targets are likely to become a separate business unit of acquirer 
firms rather than that their technological knowledge base is fully integrated. An acquirer with 
many KA alliances may therefore be overemphasizing knowledge integration, which may 
negatively impact performance in acquisitions geared to knowledge access.  
Contributions to the literature 
We make two important contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the 
literature on experience spillovers. While our findings are consistent with those of Zollo and 
Reuer (2010), we refine their findings by unpacking alliance experience and showing that KA 
and CS alliances differ in terms of knowledge integration. For example while Zollo and Reuer 
(2010) suggest that alliance experience positively affects performance in acquisitions with a low 
degree of integration, our findings show that experience in KA alliances affect performance 
negatively in acquisitions in discrete industries despite the low degree of integration. We 
therefore show the importance of the type and nature of the alliance experience in analyzing 
experience spillovers. Similarly, while we concur with Porrini (2004) that alliance experience is 
particularly beneficial in high technology industries, our analysis shows that there are structural 




technological knowledge and commercial products and that acquirers do not benefit from prior 
alliances with structurally dissimilar knowledge utilization goals to those required in their 
acquisitions.  
We also contribute to the literature on acquisition performance by analyzing the 
performance implications of experience transfers from a knowledge utilization perspective 
(Barkema and Schijven, 2008). Specifically, we improve the understanding of positive as well as 
negative experience transfers (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Barkema and Schijven, 2008; 
Zollo and Reuer, 2010) by showing that differences between knowledge utilization goals in past 
and subsequent events through their effects on organizational routines can influence experience 
transfers. While the majority of acquisitions fail in terms of ex-post performance (Haleblian et 
al., 2009), our findings suggest that poor performance can be avoided, at least in part, by taking 
the congruence in terms of knowledge utilization between acquisitions and other corporate 
development activities such as alliances into account.  
Limitations and future research 
Like many empirical studies this paper has some limitations that could be addressed by 
future research. First, by using cumulative abnormal returns as dependent variable we rely on the 
investors’ response to measure acquisition performance. Although this is a widely used approach 
to measure acquisition performance (e.g. Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Uhlenbruck, Hitt, and 
Semadeni, 2006; Schijven and Hitt, 2012) and literature suggests that cumulative abnormal 
returns correlate with other post-acquisition performance measures (e.g. Healy et al., 1992; 




over time, with the market response to the acquisition announcement may be a limitation. Future 
research might use other post-acquisition performance measures to complement our analyses.  
Second, we rely on the change in alliance partners’ patent portfolios to determine the 
technological knowledge utilization strategies in alliances. While patents are widely 
acknowledged to represent a firm’s technological capabilities (e.g. Mowery et al., 1996; 
Colombo et al., 2006; Nooteboom et al., 2007; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010; Vasudeva and 
Anand, 2011) they are ex-post measures of technological capability development. Thus in an 
alliance context measurement of technological capability development with the change in patent 
portfolios requires the assumption that patenting activity after the alliance formation is in line 
with the strategic goals of the alliance. Although there is strong support for this assumption in 
the literature (e.g. Mowery et al., 1996; Nakamura et al., 1996; Colombo, 2003; Colombo et al., 
2006) future research can supplement patent-based analyses with ex-ante measures of alliance 
strategies to increase the robustness of such analyses.  
Our study opens up further opportunities for future research. Although alliance research 
devotes considerable attention to the role of alliance experience in subsequent alliance 
performance (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000; Zollo et al., 2002; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; 
Sampson, 2005), studies on benefits of such experience outside the domain of alliances are 
surprisingly few. Our study shows that benefits of experience in different types of alliances can 
have far-reaching consequences beyond the domain of alliances. However, in this study we only 
analyze the heterogeneity in alliance experience from a knowledge utilization point of view. 
Future research might continue unpacking alliance experience using different classifications and 





The most important managerial implication of our study is that managers should not 
consider alliance and acquisition strategies in isolation but as parts of a general external 
knowledge utilization strategy. They should accurately analyze potential positive as well as 
negative spillovers across these corporate development activities. While managers can use 
alliances to equip their firms with necessary skills to successfully undertake subsequent 
acquisitions, they should take into account the knowledge utilization dynamics in their industries 
when designing their corporate development strategies. Specifically, they should screen their 
alliance partners and acquisition targets as potential sources of external knowledge and carefully 
evaluate the applicability of knowledge utilization skills developed through alliances. Our 
findings suggest that firms failing to do so can be subject to significant decreases in their market 







The increasing importance of accessing and utilizing external knowledge leads firms 
around the world to engage in greater number of alliances to enhance their competitive positions. 
A vast and growing body of research examines firms’ alliance activities using a diverse range of 
theoretical lenses to aid firms in their pursuit to create value from their alliances. Nevertheless, 
failure rates of alliances remain high and the degree to which the insights from scholarly research 
are reflected to managerial practice remains low. This implies a need for bringing alliance 
research closer to practice with more fine-grained analyses of alliances using management 
theories. In this dissertation I aim to take a step in this direction by refining the understanding of 
how firms can benefit from alliances in their attempts to develop technological as well as 
managerial capabilities.  
Theoretical contributions 
By using different theoretical lenses such as organizational learning, transfer theory and 
performance feedback theory this thesis improves our current understanding of how firms can 
benefit from alliances to develop capabilities. The three studies in this dissertation make several 
contributions to the literature. In Chapter 2 I examine how firms alter their configuration of their 
alliance portfolios as a result of performance feedback. Consistent with performance feedback 
theory (Cyert and March, 1963), I show that firms respond to poor performance by changing 
their alliance partners but remaining within the existing technological scope of their alliance 




portfolios with their existing partners. I thus contribute to alliance portfolio literature (e.g. Parise 
and Casher, 2003; Hoffmann, 2007; Wassmer, 2010) by providing a theoretical explanation as 
well as empirical evidence as to why alliance portfolios evolve in the way they do.  
In addition to providing a behavioral explanation of alliance portfolio evolution, my 
analysis also refines the relationship between performance feedback and risk taking. While the 
literature suggests that firms’ inclination for risk taking increases as their performance diverges 
from aspiration levels (Cyert and March, 1963), insights on the type and nature of risk taking 
depending on whether the performance is above or below aspirations are limited. My findings 
contribute to performance feedback theory by showing that firms assume different types of risk 
when they perform below and above their aspirations, and that the type of risk taking depends on 
firms’ perceptions as to the causes of poor or good performance. 
In Chapter 3, I examine how technological overlap and alliance experience, factors 
commonly acknowledged as important antecedents of external knowledge utilization, impact 
complementary specialization, in comparison to knowledge acquisition, as a knowledge 
utilization outcome in alliances. I show that these factors have different effects on 
complementary specialization and knowledge acquisition because they improve different sets of 
a firm’s knowledge utilization skills. I thus contribute to the literature by exploring the 
antecedents of alternative knowledge utilization outcomes in alliances (Mowery et al., 1996; 
Nakamura et al., 1996; Lubatkin et al., 2001; Mowery et al., 2002; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 
2004).  
Traditionally, from an organizational learning point of view, alliances are viewed as 




2008), and alliances in which such transfer does not take place are generally considered as arm’s-
length relationships with little consequences in terms of organizational learning (e.g. Anand and 
Khanna, 2000). Only a few studies (e.g. Lubatkin et al., 2001; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004) 
recognize complementary specialization as an alternative mode of knowledge utilization in 
alliances, and even fewer studies provide empirical evidence for this type of knowledge 
utilization (e.g. Mowery et al., 2002). My findings confirm the viability of complementary 
specialization as a knowledge utilization strategy, and extend organizational learning theory to 
explain alternative forms of knowledge utilization in alliances.  
In Chapter 4 I extend the analysis in Chapter 3 by examining how participation in 
knowledge acquisition and complementary specialization alliances affects firms’ capabilities to 
manage their subsequent acquisitions. I first make a comparative analyses of these two types of 
alliances in terms of the degree of interaction between partnering firms and argue that knowledge 
acquisition requires a substantially higher degree of interaction than complementary 
specialization. Drawing on transfer theory, I then show that the managerial capabilities gained in 
knowledge acquisition alliances are more relevant to acquisitions requiring a low degree of 
autonomy whereas the managerial capabilities gained in complementary specialization alliances 
are more useful in acquisitions requiring a high degree of autonomy. My analysis contributes to 
the literature on experience spillovers between alliances and acquisitions (Porrini, 2004; Zollo 
and Reuer, 2010) by showing how different types of alliances in a firm’s alliance portfolio affect 
the performance of its acquisitions  
Experience spillovers across different forms of interfirm relationships is an emerging 
research stream, and studies in this area (Porrini, 2004; Zollo and Reuer, 2010) thus far focus on 




that it points at the heterogeneity among a firm’s alliances in terms of management practices as 
well as the consequences of this heterogeneity for the performance of the firm’s acquisitions. By 
doing so, my analysis provides a more precise application of transfer theory than current research 
to explain experience spillovers across alliances and acquisitions. My findings also show that the 
experiences gained though different types of alliances can have consequences that extend beyond 
the domain of alliances. This underscores the importance of evaluating the consequences of 
alliances to firms’ capability development not only at individual alliance level, but also at the 
alliance portfolio level.  
Besides their individual contributions to their respective research streams, the three 
chapters collectively have two broad implications for research on alliances. First, my findings 
underscore that knowledge utilization in alliances is a multifaceted concept (Nakamura et al., 
1996; Mowery et al., 2002). While each alliance can enable a firm to acquire knowledge from its 
partner or to develop new knowledge with its partner through complementary specialization, a 
firm’s collection of alliances, i.e. its alliance portfolio, can equip the firm with managerial 
capabilities to enhance its ability to manage not only future alliances but also acquisitions. At the 
alliance portfolio level, my findings in Chapter 4 show that firms indeed can learn how to 
manage future interfirm relationships by joining alliances, but what they precisely learn depends 
on the composition of their alliance portfolios. At the single alliance level, my findings in 
Chapter 3 highlight the importance of refining the relationship between antecedents of 
knowledge utilization and its different outcomes, and identifying the relevant antecedents for the 
intended knowledge utilization goals in an alliance. Together, Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate how 
and what firms learn in different types of alliances, and illustrate the need to conduct more fine-




Second, the transfer of experience from a firm’s alliances to its acquisitions that I 
demonstrate in Chapter 4 shows that the consequences of each alliance can extend beyond that 
particular alliance and collectively a firm’s collection of alliances can comprise a strategic asset 
that can equip the firm with valuable managerial capabilities. I therefore concur with the existing 
literature that firms can enhance their competitiveness by considering their alliances as a 
portfolio (Kale and Singh, 2009). However, many firms fail to manage their alliances as such, 
and my analysis in Chapter 2 provides a possible explanation to this paradox. My findings show 
that alliance formation decisions are not always made rationally within an overall strategic 
framework, but guided by other considerations such as short term performance problems or 
cognitive biases. While a firm’s alliance decisions resulting from performance feedback are not 
necessarily misaligned with its strategic objectives, combined with the observation that the 
majority of firms do not view their alliances as a coherent portfolio (Kale and Singh, 2009), my 
findings suggest that in a substantial number of cases such alignment is not achieved. My 
analyses thus illustrate the need to better understand the circumstances under which managers 
make alliance decisions, and to reflect this understanding into theory development on alliance 
portfolios. My findings also demonstrate the usefulness of behavioral approaches in explaining 
firm heterogeneity in the absence of rationality assumption (Powell et al., 2011).  
Managerial implications 
The findings of this dissertation have profound implications for managers in shaping their 
corporate development efforts through interfirm relationships. First, managers should not assume 
that merely forming alliances would allow them to benefit from their partners’ knowledge and 
capabilities. Rather, they should determine the knowledge utilization strategies they seek to 




Specifically, to enhance their ability to acquire knowledge from alliance partners, managers 
should build sufficient experience in collaborating with external knowledge sources. To improve 
their skills to simultaneously exploit the existing technological capabilities of their firms while 
utilizing the knowledge of their alliance partners, they should screen their potential alliance 
partners in terms of technological overlap and ensure that sufficient overlap exists. 
Second, managers should not consider their alliances in isolation but as elements of their 
overall portfolio of interfirm relationships to unlock the potential benefits of their alliances. To 
leverage their experience in alliances to better manage their acquisitions, they should evaluate 
the autonomy requirements of their acquisitions and assess the extent to which these 
requirements are compatible with the knowledge utilization practices they apply in their 
alliances. If there is high compatibility, they should devise such mechanisms that enable the 
transfer of management practices from alliances to acquisitions, for example by facilitating 
knowledge exchange between their firms’ functions involved in the management of alliances and 
acquisitions. However, such compatibility may not always exist. In these cases, managers should 
be wary about transferring the management practices from their alliances to their acquisitions 
and take precautions to prevent the automatic transfer of inappropriate management routines.  
Finally, managers should be aware that alliance formation decisions have broader 
consequences for their firms that extend beyond the single alliance level. More specifically, 
while alliances with novel partners can be a feasible solution to address performance problems in 
some cases, they can alienate a firm’s existing alliance partners and negatively impact the overall 
value the firm derives from its alliance portfolio. Similarly, although performance above 
aspiration levels can implicitly confirm a firm’s choice of alliance partners and provide 




from novel external knowledge sources. Although performance feedback provides managers an 
intuitive heuristic to adjust the amount and type of risk they take in their alliance formation 
decisions, they should also take into account the broader, portfolio-level consequences of these 
decisions, rather than semi-automatically forming these decisions based on whether their firms 
perform above or below their performance aspirations. 
Limitations and future research 
 Like every empirical study, the three studies in this dissertation have limitations that can 
be addressed by future research. First, in the three studies in this dissertation I use patent data to 
empirically measure my sample firms’ technological capabilities. Although this practice is well-
established in the literature, using patent data as a proxy for technological capabilities has 
inherent limitations. For example, firms do not patent all of their inventions, not all inventions 
are patentable, and patents differ in terms of their technological significance. Hence patents can 
only partially represent firms’ technological capabilities. Furthermore, patenting rates may be 
affected by economic conditions, and differ across firms of different sizes as well as across 
industries (Griliches, 1990). Lastly, an element of arbitrariness is involved in classifying patents 
to patent classes and in adding citations to other patents by patent examiners. Despite these 
limitations, being aggregate and quantifiable measures of firms’ inventive efforts, patents remain 
a useful resource for the analysis of firms’ technological progress, and are being widely used by 
management scholars for this purpose (e.g. Ahuja, 2000a; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; 
Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009; Makri et al., 2010; Vasudeva and Anand, 2011). To reduce the 
possible impact of these limitations on my analyses, in all three studies in this dissertation I focus 
on high-technology industries in which patenting technological knowledge is common and 




membership and time-varying economic conditions. Nevertheless, future research can 
supplement patent-based measures with qualitative evidence to address the limitations of patent 
data, and increase the rigor of such analyses as those presented in this dissertation.  
 Second, in chapter 2 I examine firms’ alliance formation patterns in terms of partner 
choice and technological scope as a result of performance feedback, I do not analyze the type of 
knowledge utilization strategy (knowledge acquisition or complementary specialization) firms 
implement in these alliances. Examining the type and performance of knowledge utilization 
strategies in alliances formed as a response to performance feedback is a fruitful future research 
direction, as this would help uncover the impact of performance feedback on a firm’s value-
creation both at the single alliance and at the alliance portfolio level. 
Third, chapters 3 and 4 I classify the alliances of my sample firms as knowledge 
acquisition and complementary specialization alliances based on the development of their patent 
portfolios with respective those of their partners after the alliance formations. Although the 
literature suggests that patenting decisions are made strategically and observable patterns in 
patenting behavior are unlikely to unfold randomly, patents are ex-post measures of firms’ 
technological capability development efforts. My analyses therefore rely on the assumption that 
firms’ ex-post patenting activity is in line with their ex-ante strategic goals in their alliances. 
While there is strong support in the literature for the validity of this assumption literature (e.g. 
Mowery et al., 1996; Nakamura et al., 1996; Colombo, 2003; Colombo et al., 2006), future 
research can investigate the correspondence between ex-ante indications of strategic goals and 




 Finally, in my analyses in chapters 3 and 4 I consider knowledge acquisition and 
complementary specialization as mutually exclusive knowledge utilization strategies. Although 
this approach allows me to empirically distinguish between alternative knowledge utilization 
strategies and is consistent with the existing research in this area, it can be more realistic to 
consider these strategies as points along a continuum rather than discrete types of organizational 
learning, as most alliances are likely to include elements of both types of knowledge utilization. 
Future research can develop more sophisticated empirical measures to address this issue and to 
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